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INTRODUCTION
In the landmark decision of Costa v. ENEL,1 in which the
European Court of Justice unequivocally announced that European
Community2 law prevails over inconsistent national laws of Member
States, the Court made the following ambitious claim: "By contrast
with ordinary international treaties, the E.E.C. Treaty has created its
own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty,
became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States
and which their courts are bound to apply. ' '3 The Court repeatedly
has confirmed the direct effect and supremacy of provisions of Euro-
pean Community Law.4
Although there is abundant literature describing the content of
European Community Law, there is little commentary directed
toward explaining the existence, nature and extent of European
Community Law from the viewpoint of legal theory.5 The thesis of
this Article is that the legal theory articulated by H.L.A. Hart in The
Concept of Law6 provides a model and framework of analysis that
illustrates, explains, and supports the Court's claim that there exists
an autonomous European Community legal system that penetrates
the national legal systems of the Member States, binding the
national courts, and that Community Law is thus to be distinguished
1. Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] E.C.R. 585,3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425 (1964). For
a description of the case, see infra note 156.
2. The European Community consists of three "Communities" that were estab-
lished by three separate treaties:
-Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter cited as E.C.S.C. Treaty];
-Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as E.E.C. Treaty];
-Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 259 [hereinafter cited as Euratom Treaty].
For easy access to the Treaties, see EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN
PERSPECTIVE-DocUMENT SUPPLEMENT 1-39, 40-86, 206-43 (E. Stein, P. Hay & M.
Waelbroeck eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT]. The European
Economic Community (E.E.C.) is by far the most important of these three communities,
and where detailed discussion of the provisions of Community Law is required in this
Article, such discussion will focus thereon.
The original six members of the European Community were Belgium, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands (the three Benelux countries), France, Italy, and West Germany. Den-
mark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom acceded to the European Community on Janu-
ary 1, 1973, and Greece acceded on January 1, 1981. Spain and Portugal currently are
negotiating to join.
3. Costa, [1964] E.C.R. at 593, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 455.
4. See infra notes 132-61 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Starr, Hart's Rule of Recognition and the EE. C, 28 N. IR. LEGAL Q.
258 (1977). Starr perceives a need to develop an appropriate legal model and calls for the
development of such a model based on H.L.A. Hart's theories. Id at 267-68.
6. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
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from traditional international law.7
This Article posits that, subject to certain possible limitations,
Hart's theory provides a "powerful tool for analysis," 8 not only for
the concept of law and a legal~system in general, but particularly in
the context of European Community Law and the Community legal
system. Just as the question has been posed: "Is international law
really law?", 9 one might ask the same question in the case of the
European Community, the product of a number of international
treaties.' 0 In fact, it is not doubted seriously that European Commu-
nity Law is indeed law; and Hart's theory is particularly helpful in
explaining why this is so.
This contention does not depend upon Hart's claim that the
term "law" can be used with regard to international law because
such usage is not likely to obstruct any theoretical or practical aim 1
and that the word "law" is used appropriately because there exist
analogies of function and content, though not of form, with munici-
pal law.12 This Article will make the much larger claim that, in the
case of the European Community, the analogy is also one of form in
that the formal structure of Community Law displays those features
that characterize a well-developed "legal system." Thus, it will be
argued, Community Law is "much nearer in structure to a municipal
system" than traditional international law13 and consequently the
use of the appellations "law" and "legal system" is undoubtedly
justified.
Section One of the Article will summarize the central elements
of Hart's theory. Section Two will examine European Community
Law as it affects the traditional subjects of international law, namely
states. Even from this limited perspective, it will be seen that Euro-
pean Community Law differs from traditional forms of international
law and constitutes a legal system in Hart's sense. The true extent
and unique nature of the Community legal system then will be
revealed fully by examining in Section Three the applicability and
status of Community Law within the Member States and, in particu-
lar, the manner in which the legal position of individuals is affected
7. While advocating the explanatory power of Hart's model, the author of this Arti-
cle is not suggesting, of course, that the Court of Justice itself necessarily had such a
jurisprudential model in mind when making its pronouncements regarding the nature of
Community Law or when using the term "legal system" in Costa (English translation
from Italian language of the case).
8. H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 95. The various criticisms leveled at Hart's gen-
eral theory are examined infra note 65.
9. See id at 209, where Hart broaches this question.
10. See supra note 2.
11. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 209.
12. See id at 231.
13. See id.
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directly and indirectly by the law-making powers that the Commu-
nity institutions exercise in fulfilling a wide range of governmental
functions in the economic sphere.
I
PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF HART'S THEORY
Hart rejects Austin's theory' 4 that the foundation of a legal sys-
tem is the majority's habitual obedience to orders that are backed by
threats issued by a sovereign that obeys no one. He grounds this
rejection on Austin's failure to account for various essential features
of a modem municipal legal system.
Hart attempts to account for those features by formulating a
theory that emphasizes two central ideas. First, in elucidating the
concept of a rule, Hart distinguishes between its internal and exter-
nal aspects. The internal aspect views a rule from the perspective of
the members of the social group who accept the rule as a standard
for regulating their behavior. The external aspect views a rule from
the perspective of an observer who stands outside the social group
and does not accept the rule as a standard for his own behavior. 15
Second, Hart makes a fundamental distinction between primary
rules of obligation and secondary rules. Primary rules of obligation
are concerned with the actions that those subject to the rule must or
must not do, while secondary rules are about the primary rules
themselves. 16 Hart sees "the key to the science of jurisprudence"' in
the combination of these two kinds of rules. This combination is at
"the heart of a legal system" and, moreover, is "a most powerful tool
for the analysis of much that has puzzled both the jurist and the
political theorist."' 8 The discussion that follows elaborates upon
these two ideas-the internal/external aspects of a rule and the com-
bination of primary and secondary rules.
A. PRIMARY RULES AND SECONDARY RULES
1. Rules in General
The existence of any rule consists of more than mere regularity
of behavior and-in the case of duty-imposing rules-the regular
14. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart
ed. 1954), extracted in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 223-37 (D. Lloyd & M.D.A.
Freeman 4th ed. 1979). For Hart's description and criticism of Austin's theories, see
H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 18-76.
15. H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 86.
16. Id. at 92.
17. Id. at 79.
18. Id. at 95.
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application of sanctions to violators.19 To focus on this alone ignores
the internal aspect of rules, namely, the way in which any rule func-
tions in the lives of (normally) the majority of the members of the
social group in question.20 Those who view a rule from the internal
point of view accept the rule as a standard or a reason for behaving
in a particular way, for judging the conduct of others, and-presum-
ably only in the case of primary rules of obligation-for imposing
sanctions on violators.
An observer who stands outside the social group and views the
rule from the external perspective may refer to the internal aspect of
a rule when he makes the statement that a given rule exists or gener-
ally is accepted by the group as a standard in practice.21 Such an
outside observer, however, may fail to note the very existence of
rules if he does not refer to this internal aspect but instead simply
records the regularity of behavior and the regular application of
sanctions to violators.22
2. Primary Rules of Obligation
Certain rules are concerned with governing the behavior of
those subject to them; they are characterized by a varied normative
vocabulary (e.g., ought, should, must).2 3 Not all such rules, however,
should be regarded as imposing obligations or duties. According to
Hart, such a rule imposes an obligation only "when the general
demand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to
bear upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate is great."24 If the
social pressure takes the form of physical sanctions, the rule appro-
priately is classified as part of the law of the group, rather than part
of its morality,, which is supported primarily by feelings of shame,
remorse, or guilt.25 The social pressure can be conceived of as a
chain that binds those subject to the obligations, the other end being
held by the group or its official representatives-e.g., obligations
under the criminal law--or entrusted by the group to a private indi-
vidual-e.g., obligations under civil law.26
19. Id. at 87.
20. Id. at 88.
21. Id. at 86-87.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 83.
24. Id. at 84.
25. Id. Hart identifies two other characteristics of "obligations" that go together
with the seriousness of the social pressure supporting the rule. First, the rules are consid-
ered important because they are thought to be necessary to maintain social life, e.g., rules
restricting violence and rules requiring honesty or truth or the keeping of promises. Sec-
ond, the conduct required involves some element of self-sacrifice. See generally id. at 85.
26. Id.
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3. Secondary Rules
Hart deems it possible to conceive of a society where the only
means of social control consist of primary rules of obligation, pro-
vided that certain factual conditions are met.27 Such a form of social
control, however, would suffer from three major defects, all of which
can be remedied by supplementing these primary rules of obligation
with secondary rules. The introduction of the remedy for each
defect can be considered "a step from the pre-legal into the legal
world" and "certainly all three remedies together are enough to con-
vert the regime of primary rules into what is indisputably a legal
system. 28
The first defect is the uncertainty of a simple regime of primary
rules. Such a regime does not form a system but is simply a set of
separate standards that lack any criteria for determining the exist-
ence or scope of a particular rule. The remedy for this defect is the
introduction of a secondary "Rule of Recognition" that specifies
some characteristic, e.g., legislative enactment and judicial decision,
that is a conclusive, affirmative indication that the primary rule is a
rule of the social group. Thus, the Rule of Recognition specifies the
"criteria of validity" 29 for the rules of the group or, in other words,
its various "sources of law." 30 The emergence of such a Rule of Rec-
ognition provides authoritative criteria that identify and unify the
various rules of the group. After this occurrence, the rules are no
longer a discrete, unconnected set.31
A second defect in a system of social control that is dependent
solely on primary rules of obligation is the static character of a
regime of primary rules. In the absence of means to change deliber-
ately primary rules by specific acts, the rules only can change slowly.
This defect is remedied by the introduction of two types of secon-
dary power-conferring "Rules of Change": (1) those that empower a
certain body to create or repeal general, primary rules of obligation,
as by legislative enactment; and (2) those that empower private indi-
viduals to create particular structures of rights and duties to govern
27. See id. at 89. Hart identifies the following three factual conditions: (1) the rules
must contain restrictions on the free use of violence, theft, and deception; (2) those who
accept the rules must be in the majority, because if those who rejected the rules were
more than the minority, they would have too little social pressure to fear; and (3) "only a
small community closely knit by ties of kinship, common sentiment, and belief, and
placed in a stable environment, could live successfully by such a regime of unofficial
rules." Id. at 89-90.
28. Id. at 91.
29. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
30. Id.
31. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 90, 92-93.
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their relationships, e.g., wills and contracts. 32
The third defect identified by Hart is the inefficiency of the dif-
fuse social pressure supporting the primary rules of obligation. This
defect is remedied by the introduction of two types of secondary
power-conferring "Rules of Adjudication": (1) those that empower
certain individuals-judges-to ascertain the fact of violation of the
primary rules; and (2) those that empower the judges to direct the
application of sanctions by other officials. 33
"Rules of Change" and "Rules of Adjudication" are part of the
"Rule of Recognition" of a system because they necessarily specify
various sources of law such as legislative enactment and judicial
decision. 34
B. THE RULE OF RECOGNITION
It is helpful to elaborate upon two features of Hart's Rule of
Recognition in order to develop fully the thesis of this Article. The
Article first will examine the complexity of the Rule of Recognition,
and then will consider the existence of the Rule as a statement of
fact.
1. The Complexity of the Rule of Recognition
Hart's Rule of Recognition specifies the various criteria of
validity for the particular rules of the system, i.e., its sources of law.
It is important to note a number of points about these criteria or
sources of law. First, in a modem legal system, the various criteria
of validity or sources of law are numerous and the Rule of Recogni-
tion is correspondingly complex, e.g., written constitution, legislative
enactment, and judicial decision.35
Second, each source of law is ultimate in the sense that the
authority for a particular rule of the system can be traced up through
a hierarchy of rules that provide criteria for the validity of the rules
below. This-process eventually leads to some ultimate source or cri-
terion of validity that is not itself validated by some higher rule.36
Finally, the ultimacy of the various sources of law does not,
however, imply that they are all of equal rank. Instead, they may
occupy a place on a scale of superiority, and indeed one of them may
32. Id. at 90-91, 93-94.
33. Id. at 91, 94-95.
34. Id. at 93-95.
35. Id. at 98.
36. Hart's particular example is the purported by-law of the Oxfordshire County
Council, the chain of validity being: by-law--statutory order of the Minister of Health-
statute empowering the Minister to issue statutory orders-"ultimate" criterion of valid-
ity being that "what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law." See generally id. at 103-04.
1984]
10 CORAVELL INTERAATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
be supreme over all the others. For example, the legislature may be
competent to deprive judicial precedent of its status as law and, at
the same time, the legislature's power may be limited by a constitu-
tion and its enactments held invalid if they transgress those limits. 37
2. The Existence of a Rule of Recognition as a Statement of Fact
In the simple regime of primary rules, the statement that a given
rule exists is an external statement of fact such as might be made by
an observer of the system, even though he thereby refers to the inter-
nal aspect of the rule, i.e., its general acceptance as a standard in
practice. 38 In the same way, Hart argues, the statement that a given
Rule of Recognition exists also can be only an external statement of
fact because it "exists only as a complex, but normally concordant,
practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the
law by reference to certain criteria.' 39 Those who use such a (nor-
maly unstated) Rule of Recognition, however, share the internal
point of view because they thereby manifest their acceptance of it.
Moreover, the existence of a Rule of Recognition gives new meaning
to the statement that a particular rule exists. Although the statement
that a Rule of Recognition exists can be only an external statement
of fact (because there are no criteria for its own validity) the state-
ment that a particular rule of the system exists now also may be an
internal statement of law meaning that the rule is "valid given the
system's criteria of validity."4
C. THE EXISTENCE OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
Just as the statement that a Rule of Recognition "exists" is an
external statement of fact, so too is the statement that a "legal system
exists" in a given country or among a particular social group. This
statement refers "in compressed, portmanteau form, to a number of
heterogeneous social facts, usually concomitant. ' 41 More particu-
larly, there are certain minimum conditions that are both necessary
and sufficient for the existence of a legal system, namely:
(1) There exists a union of primary rules of obligation and secondary rules
of change, adjudication, and recognition.
(2) The officials of the system, in particular the courts, effectively accept the
secondary rules as critical, common, public standards of official
behavior.
37. H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 102-03.
38. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
39. H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 107.
40. Id. at 107. For Hart, this also is the justification for classifying the Rule of Rec-
ognition as "law" as well as "fact." See generally id. at 107-08.
41. Id. at 109.
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(3) There exists general compliance with the rules of behavior that are
"valid" under the system's Rule of Recognition.
42
One assumes that because the officials of the system accept the
secondary rules, they also accept the rules of behavior. In the sim-
pler regime of primary rules alone, the majority of the group also
must share this internal viewpoint if there are to be any rules at all.
By contrast, in the more complex case of a legal system, only the
officials need share the internal viewpoint, although in a healthy
society the rules will in fact also be accepted by the majority of pri-
vate citizens. 43 Although Hart is not explicit, one also assumes that
law and a legal system are in fact the instruments by which the gov-
ernmental power of a particular corresponding political order regu-
lates the conduct of its subjects.44 Therefore, in an advanced socio-
political order with a correspondingly sophisticated legal system, the
officials of the legal system also may be viewed as the officials of the
particular socio-political order.
This view of the existence of the Rule of Recognition and a
legal system as external statements of fact assists Hart in explaining
various problematical phenomena concerning the embryology, exist-
ence, and pathology of legal systems. In those cases, there fails to be
general compliance with the rules that are valid under the Rule of
Recognition used by a particular set of officials. These cases may be
divided into two main categories.
L Cases of Complete Failure: Rival Claims to Govern Between
Different Sets of Officials
In certain instances, rival sets of officials, using different Rules
of Recognition, may claim to govern a particular social group.
These situations occur most frequently as the result of political
revolution, enemy occupation, or a colony's pursuit of independence.
In each of these cases, a new legal system comes into existence when
there is general compliance with the rules recognized as valid under
the Rule of Recognition employed by the new set of officials-the
revolutionary government, the enemy authorities, or the local offi-
cials. These rules, rather than the rules of the old legal system, then
42. Id. at 113.
43. Id. at 113-14.
44. Indeed it is perhaps the generality (application to all members of the community)
and the ultimacy (recognition as the final authority) of the power to govern a particular
community that distinguishes this governmental power, acting in its political order and
expressing itself in the form of "law" and a "legal system," from other "political" orders
with their corresponding rule system, e.g., the rules of a club or a church.
1984]
12 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURAAL
generally are effective in the territory.45
The relationship between international and municipal law
presents a similar case. For Hart, theoriesa6 that assert that interna-
tional law and municipal law must always form a single system
within which municipal law or international law accepts the other as
"valid" fly in the face of common sense by assuming that the state-
ment that a legal system exists must be a proposition of law. Hart
claims that it is more realistic to recognize that international law and
municipal law may be, in fact, two separate and independent legal
systems.4 7 Presumably therefore, to the extent that international law,
in fact, is not accepted by the municipal officials as a source of law in
the Rule of Recognition used by them, it cannot be part of the legal
system that exists in the territory.
2. Cases of Partial Failure.: Disunity Among the Same Set of
Officials
Hart distinguishes the above situations from the case where
there is a division within the official world, more particularly the
judiciary. For example, in South Africa in 1954, a rift occurred
between the legislature and its specially-created courts and the regu-
lar courts over the legal competence and powers of the legislature.48
Hart characterizes such a case as a disagreement in the official
world over the content of the Rule of Recognition that contains the
system's ultimate criteria of validity. Hart's view is that all rules
contain a "core of certainty" and a "penumbra of doubt" and this is
equally true of the Rule of Recognition. The same legal system may
continue to exist despite the absence of that complete official-espe-
cially judicial-consensus that prevails under normal conditions.49
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Hart notes that at the present time the formal structure of inter-
national law more closely resembles a simple regime of primary
rules of obligation than a well-developed, municipal legal system.
This is because international law lacks secondary rules of change
and adjudication, and arguably also lacks a secondary Rule of Rec-
ognition. Hart observes that there is no international legislature, no
court with compulsory jurisdiction-a state cannot be brought
45. H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 114-18.
46. See, e.g., H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 373-83 (1946).
47. H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 118, 248n. This statement applies presumably to
the extent that international law can be called a "legal system" at all. See also infra notes
50-51 & 57-58 and accompanying text.
48. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 118-19.
49. Id. at 119.
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before an international tribunal without its prior consent-anid there
are no centrally organized sanctions.50 For Hart, the principlespacta
sunt servanda and "states should behave as they customarily behave"
do not qualify as a Rule of Recognition ("basic norm") that confers
validity on the other rules of international law. Rather, he believes
that international law should be conceived of as a set of separate
rules, similar to the regime of primary or customary law, that also
includes rules providing for the binding force of treaties.
5 1
These formal differences between municipal law and interna-
tional law, however, do not justify the claim that international law is
not really law at all. The rules of international law impose obliga-
tions on states despite the lack of centrally organized sanctions. The
predictive analysis of law as orders backed by threats is incorrect,
and all that is necessary for a rule to be binding-to impose an obli-
gation-is that it be accepted by the majority of states as a standard
of conduct and be supported with serious social pressure such as
demands for conformity and insistent criticism when states deviate.
5 2
Moreover, these primary rules of obligation should be classified as
law rather than as morality. There exist analogies of content and
function that bring such rules closer to municipal law than to moral-
ity 5 3 In short, the use of the term "international law" obstructs no
theoretical or practical aim and is justified fully upon basic
principles.54
Similarly, there is no inconsistency in the notion of a sovereign
state being subject to obligations that arise under rules of interna-
tional law. The word "sovereign" means no more than independent.
Sovereign states do not by nature stand outside the law.55 To the
extent, therefore, that a state's independence or autonomy is limited
by binding rules of obligation under international law, its sover-
50. Id. at 209.
51. Id. at 228-29.
52. Id. at 211-13.
53. For example:
(1) the rules are supported by "pressure" consisting not of the triggering of feelings
of shame or guilt, but rather in references to precedents, treaties, and juristic writ-
ings, etc., often with no mention of the moral worth of the act in question;
(2) many of the concepts, methods, and techniques of international law are the
same as those of modem municipal law;
(3) like the rules of municipal law, the rules of international law frequently are
morally indifferent, contain arbitrary distinctions, and often are characterized by
formalities and highly specific detail, all of which are typical features of law but not
of morality; and
(4) in contrast to morality, there is nothing in the nature or function of interna-
tional law that precludes the idea of change by legislative enactment.
See generally id. at 221-26.
54. Id. at 209.
55. Id. at 216.
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eignty is also limited.56
Hart envisages a number of different possible forms of interna-
tional authority or limits upon state sovereignty:
(1) A world legislature with legally unlimited powers to regulate the inter-
nal and external affairs of all states.
(2) A federal legislature, exercising legal competence only over certain
specified matters or limited by guarantees of specific rights of the con-
stituent states.
(3) A regime where the only form of legal control consists of rules generally
accepted as applicable to all.
(4) A regime where the only form of obligation is contractual or self-
imposed, i.e., a state's independence would be limited only by its
consent.
57
The first two constructs resemble Hart's formal structure of a well-
developed legal system that is characterized by a union of primary
and secondary rules; one may refer to this as a strong limitation on
state sovereignty. The latter two schemes, by contrast, are character-
ized by a lack of such a union of primary and secondary rules and
thus do not form a legal system; one may refer to this as a weak
limitation on state sovereignty.
Hart suggests that the present formal structure of international
law resembles the third scheme. He rejects the first two constructs
because they presuppose, quite contrary to the actual state of inter-
national law, the existence of secondary rules with corresponding
institutions. The fourth possibility does not apply because, even
though international law is largely treaty law, there are cases where a
state is bound by obligations of international law that arise under
rules to which it had no opportunity to consent. 58
Hart, therefore, rejects the voluntarist or auto-limitation theo-
ries of international law that assert that all international obligations
are self-imposed.5 9 Even if, in theory, every specific action were to
derive its obligatory character from a promise-as, presumably,
under possibility four-this still would presuppose the existence of a
rule that does not depend upon the state's consent in the individual
case, namely the rule that a state is bound to do whatever it under-
takes by appropriate words.60 A fortiori Hart presumably would
56. Id. at 217-18.
57. Id. at 217.
58. Hart describes these cases as follows: (1) the emergence of a new state; (2) a state
acquiring territory or undergoing some other change; and (3) the more debatable cases
concerning the effect on non-parties of general or multilateral treaties. Thus, Hart seems
to be making a distinction between: (1) cases where a state concludes a particular treaty
and specifically gives its consent to be bound by the treaty obligations; and (2) other cases
where a state has not concluded a particular treaty but is nevertheless bound by obliga-
tions of international law. See generally id. at 220-21.
59. Id. at 218-21.
60. Id. at 220.
[Vol. 17:1
COMMUNITY LAW
reject such theories in the case of the first and second possibilities or
any analogous form that is characterized by secondary rules and cor-
responding institutions. To assert that in such cases every specific
obligation derives its obligatory character from a state's consent
would be the international analogue of the social contract theories of
political science.61 This is presumably so even though it may be pos-
sible to trace the socio-political order with its system of law to some
consensual act on the part of its subjects, either in terms of its histori-
cal origin-a group of individuals organizing together in society or a
group of sovereign states concluding a treaty-or, in the ultimate
sense, that if consent were withdrawn on a large scale, the socio-
political order could disintegrate-as in the case of a political
revolution, anarchy, or "secession" from a grouping of states.
E. THE SPECIAL CASE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
Historically, the European Community is a creature of a
number of international treaties. 62 It would be incorrect, however, to
view European Community Law as simply another species of tradi-
tional international law as described by Hart. European Community
Law is not "law" in the Hartian sense merely because it is a set of
primary rules of obligation that Member States accept as binding
standards of conduct and is supported by serious social pressure such
as demands for conformity and insistent criticism of deviations; and
thus represents a weak limitation on state sovereignty. 63 Rather,
there are two vital differences between the formal structure of tradi-
tional international law and that of European Community Law.
These differences represent a particularly strong limitation upon
state sovereignty and justify the common description of the Commu-
nity as a "supranationar' rather than an international entity.64 First,
61. Id. at 219.
62. See supra note 2.
63. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
64. The term "supranational" customarily is used to distinguish the European Com-
munity from more traditional "international" organizations. In a legal sense, the term
"supranational" may refer to any or all of a number of possible distinguishing character-
istics of such an organization: (1) the existence of independent organs with an autono-
mous decision-making power, (2) the power to take decisions binding the constituent
member states by majority vote; and (3) the power to take decisions that directly affect
the legal position of individuals within the constituent member states without the inter-
vention of the national governments.
To a political scientist, the term also may refer to certain additional features, e.g., the
quality of the decision-making or the tendency for the existence of such an organization
in one area to promote integration in other areas as a sort of "spill-over" effect (otherwise
known as the theory of "functionalism"). For discussions concerning the meaning of the
term "supranationar' as opposed to "international," see Robertson, Legal Problems of
European Integration, Hague Academy of Int'l Law, 91 Recueil des Cours 105, 143-48
(1957); I.L. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES-THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
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even viewed from the limited perspective of the traditional subjects
of international law-the sovereign Member States-the formal
structure of European Community Law displays those features that
characterize a well-developed legal system as opposed to a simple set
of primary rules. Second, Community Law and the Community
legal system penetrate deeply and pervasively into the Member
States. This penetration is manifested in particular by the direct and
indirect modification of the legal position of individuals-the tradi-
tional subjects of municipal law.
The remainder of this Article demonstrates these two proposi-
tions and their consequences. Where the argument requires a dis-
cussion of the detailed legal rules of the Community, the Article
confines itself to describing the European Economic Community
(E.E.C.), which is by far the most important of the three European
Communities. 65
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 109-12, 379-80 (4th ed. 1971); Haas, Technocracy, Plu-
ralism and the New Europe, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Dep't of Pol. Science Reprint Series
64-66 (1963); T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 6-7
(1981).
65. Hart does not discuss the European Community in THE CONCEPT OF LAW. He
does speculate, however, that "perhaps international law is at present in a stage of transi-
tion towards acceptance of. . . forms which would bring it nearer in structure to a
municipal system," and that, if and when this transition is completed, the analogies with
municipal law would be analogies of form as well as of content and function. H.L.A.
HART, supra note 6, at 231.
The thesis of this Article is that analysis of the European Community using Hart's
concept of law and a legal system reveals that this transition has indeed been made in the
case of the Community, which therefore possesses a well-developed "legal system" in the
full sense as described by Hart. Moreover, a similar analysis of the structural features of
other regimes of international law may be useful in attempting to evaluate the extent to
which either the "general system" of international law or the various "sub-systems" of
different international organizations also are in the process of making the transition
towards a well-developed "legal system" in the same sense. Cf. Sorensen, Autonomous
Legal Orders: Some Considerations Relating to a Systems Anaysis of International Orga-
nizations in the World Legal Order, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 559 (1983) (urging that the
question whether an international organization possesses an autonomous legal system
should be approached by examining law-making powers, application of law and settle-
ment of disputes, and concluding that it probably will be possible to show that a multi-
tude of independent systems exist).
The present writer therefore clearly accepts Hart's claim that his general theory pro-
vides a "powerful tool of analysis" for the concept of law and a legal system. This is
subject, however, to the possible limitations on his general theory that have been articu-
lated by various critics. Some of the more cogent criticisms may be enumerated as fol-
lows. First, Hart's representation of law as a system of rules is inadequate in that it fails
to account for the various "principles" of law that state "a reason that argues in one
direction but [do] not necessitate a particular decision ... " as do rules. See R. DWOR-
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 1-45 (1978). Second, since there may be little in com-
mon between the various types of secondary rules, it may be an over-simplification to
treat them as a unified class. Third, Hart's portrayal of the internal aspect of law also
may be somewhat of an over-simplification because it may not be possible to identify the
precise viewpoint that animates officials towards the secondary rules. Finally, the struc-
ture of a legal system cannot be grasped adequately without an understanding of the
many institutions that provide the framework for the operation of the rules of the system.
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II
THE EXISTENCE OF THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM:
MEMBER STATES AS THE SUBJECTS OF THE
COMMUNITY POLITICAL AND LEGAL ORDER
Hart has identified three conditions66 that are necessary and suf-
ficient for the existence of a legal system as opposed to a simple set
of primary rules of obligation. Because European Community Law
satisfies each of these conditions, one truly may speak of the legal
system of the European Community, even from the limited perspec-
For a fuller discussion of these various criticisms and possible responses, see D. Lloyd &
M.D.A. Freeman, supra note 14, at 192-97. Even though these criticisms may put into
question Hart's claim that certain minimum conditions are "sufficient" for the existence
of a legal system, they appear to be of less moment for his claim that these conditions are
"necessary" for the existence of a "legal system." It is upon the latter claim that the
present writer primarily relies.
In the companion article in this issue, Professor Janis forcefully demonstrates that the
rules of international law traditionally, and properly, have concerned the rights and obli-
gations of individuals as well as states, and that individuals therefore also are to be con-
sidered as proper traditional subjects of international law in the sense of being the
incumbents of rights and duties under international law. Professor Janis considers,
therefore, that we should reject any definition of international law that asserts that only
states are the proper subjects of international law (which he terms the positivist, subject-
based definition of international law), in favor of a source-based definition that by its
very nature includes individuals as its subjects. This perspective, however, should not
obscure certain fundamental points. First, many rights and obligations of individuals
under international law are intended to be realized within the municipal sphere.
Whatever the rights and obligations of an individual as aproposition ofinternational law,
therefore, such rights and obligations usually exist in fact as part of the body of law
applied to the individual within the municipal sphere only when a state performs its own
obligations under international law by correctly "transforming" such rights and obliga-
tions into norms of its municipal legal system or possibly if its national courts give effect
to them directly because they recognize international law as a "source" of law in the Rule
of Recognition they use. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text & infra p. 35.
Second, the private individual only gradually is being accorded the procedural privilege
of prosecuting a claim before an international tribunal, as contrasted with the right to
invoke international law in the courts of the municipal legal system. Finally, the formal
structure of general international law and of the separate regimes of various, more tradi-
tional international organizations is deficient when compared with the formal structure
of a municipal legal system or that of the Community legal system. Similarly, rights and
obligations typically are not created for individuals under international law through an
international organization's exercise of wide-ranging "governmental powers."
For these reasons in particular, it is useful to analyze the European Community from
the perspective of the Member States as the "traditional subjects of international law" on
the one hand, and private individuals as the "traditional subjects of municipal law" on
the other, even though it may be accepted-and the present writer does not understand
Hart's version of positivism to deny--that the private individual indeed may be a tradi-
tional subject of international law in the sense of being the incumbent of rights and
duties under international law. See generally LG. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION To
INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-80 (8th ed. 1977) (discussing the extent to which individuals, as
well as states, are subjects of international law, and distinguishing between different pos-
sible meanings of the term "subject of international law").
66. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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tive of the Member States, the traditional subjects of international
law.
A. THE FIRST CONDITION: A UNION OF PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY RULES OF CHANGE, ADJUDICATION, AND
RECOGNITION
Even a very cursory examination reveals the extremely wide
range of areas over which the Member States' freedom of action,
their sovereignty, is limited by obligations under E.E.C. law.67
Indeed, the very scope of the E.E.C. Treaty itself may be regarded as
a feature that distinguishes it from traditional international agree-
ments. In encompassing this wide range of areas, the E.E.C. Treaty
aims at the creation of a common market and, eventually, a full eco-
nomic and monetary union between the Member States.68 The
"common market" is created essentially by laying down two main
67. Article 3 of the E.E.C. Treaty enumerates the various activities of the E.E.C.:
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out
therein:
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quan-
titative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures
having equivalent effect;
(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commercial
policy towards third countries;
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of move-
ment for persons, services and capital;
(d) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of agriculture;
(e) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport;
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market
is not distorted;
(g) the application of procedures by which the economic policies of Member
States can be coordinated and disequilibria in their balances of payments
remedied;
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for
the proper functioning of the common market;
(i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve employment
opportunities for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of
living;
(j) the establishment of a European Investment Bank to facilitate the economic
expansion of the Community by opening up fresh resources;
(k) the association of the overseas countries and territories in order to increase
trade and to promote jointly economic and social development.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at
41.
68. Article 2 of the E.E.C. Treaty states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated rais-
ing of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to
it.
Id, art. 2.
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types of rules: (1) rules abolishing the restrictions imposed by the
Member States upon the free movement of goods and the factors of
production-labor, capital, and enterprise; and (2) other rules
designed to supplement and support these "four freedoms," e.g.,
rules on competition, approximation of laws, common commercial
policy, and special legal regimes for agriculture and transport.69
In order to facilitate realization of the Community's aims, the
Treaty creates a number of Community institutions upon which it
confers extensive powers;70 in Hart's terminology, the Treaty con-
tains secondary power conferring rules of change and adjudication.
Indeed, the European Court of Justice regards the conferment of
these sovereign powers upon the Community's own institutions to be
a distinctive feature of the Community that distinguishes it from
more traditional forms of international law and demonstrates its
originality.71
1 Secondary Rules of Change
Although the Treaties contain many detailed rules of Commu-
nity Law, Community institutions still must promulgate legislation
that, inter alia, creates new primary rules that impose obligations
upon the Member States. Article 189 of the E.E.C. Treaty enumer-
ates three basic forms of binding acts-regulations, directives, and
decisions.72 The nature and extent of a particular obligation varies
69. On the whole, the creation of the common market is an easier task than the reali-
zation of an economic and monetary union. The basic steps necessary for achieving the
objective of a common market already have been laid down in some detail in the E.E.C.
Treaty and primarily involve the abolition of restrictions. The creation of an economic
and monetary union, on the other hand, requires that positive steps be taken in the form
of detailed policy choices, and the relevant Treaty provisions are rather vague and gen-
eral. See, e.g., F.R. RooT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT-THEORY, POL-
ICY, ENTERPRISE 378-79 (1973).
70. Article 4 of the E.E.C. Treaty provides in part:
1. The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be carried out by the following
institutions:
an Assembly,
a Council,
a Commission,
a Court of Justice.
Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this
Treaty.
2. The Council and the Commission shall be assisted by an Economic and
Social Committee acting in an advisory capacity.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 4, reprintedin DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at
41.
71. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. These institutions, together with
the Member States and private individuals, also may be regarded as subjects of the Com-
munity legal system.
72. For further discussion concerning these acts, see infra notes 136-38 & 151-54 and
accompanying text. Article 189 provides:
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according to the type of act in which it is embodied. Thus, the Com-
munity can be said to possess a "gradation of powers. '73
A Community institution is empowered to legislate only when a
particular Treaty provision confers authority.74 The controlling
Treaty provision specifies what form the legislation may take and
what procedure is to be followed. 75
At the risk of some generalization, the legislative process of the
E.E.C. may be described very briefly as follows. 76 The principal
decision-making power resides with the Council of Ministers of the
European Communities. 77 This body is composed of representatives
of the Member States and therefore is similar in composition to the
In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall, in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives,
take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety
and directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Mem-
ber State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189, reprintedin DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 73.
73. See Bebr, Law of the European Communities and Municipal Law, 34 MOD. L.
REv. 481-82 (1971).
74. The Treaty, however, does contain a "necessary and proper clause:"
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and
this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 235, reprintedin DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 81.
75. For example, Article 87.1 of the E.E.C. Treaty provides:
Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
Assembly, adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the
principles set out in Articles 85 and 86.
If such provisions have not been adopted within the period mentioned, they
shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 87.1, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note
2, at 58.
76. For a more detailed description, see E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 34-61 (1976).
77. See generally E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 145-53, reprinted in DOCUMENT
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 69-70; Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single
Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 152)
2 (1967) (Fr.) arts. 1-8 [hereinafter cited as Merger Treaty], reprinted in DOCUMENT SUP-
PLEMENT, supra note 2, at 245-50. Article 145 of the E.E.C. Treaty specifies the functions
of the Council:
To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained, the Council shall,
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty:
-ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member States;
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traditional, inter-governmental decision-making bodies already
known to international law. Moreover, although the Treaty calls for
the majority of decisions to be made by qualified majority based on
weighted voting, the Member States in practice seek to achieve una-
nimity in all cases where "very important interests" of one of the
Member States are at stake.78
The legislative process, however, also contains some highly
original features. The Commission of the European Communities
possesses the "power of initiative.' ' 79 The Commission consists of
fourteen members who are nationals of the Member States and who
are to act in the general interest of the Community and are to be
completely independent of the Member States' governments.80 Con-
sequently, in general, the inter-governmental Council cannot act
until the independent body that represents the interests of the Com-
munity as a whole makes a proposal.8' This decision-making struc-
ture in fact has been described as a "constitutional system" created
by the Treaties that "set[s] up a particular form of separation of pow-
ers."82 Furthermore, in many cases the Council is under a duty to
consult the 434 member, directly-elected Assembly of the European
Communities8 3 (European Parliament) and the Economic and Social
-have power to take decisions.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 145, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 69.
78. This practice is the result of the "Luxembourg Voting Compromise" of 1966.
See E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 76, at 63-66.
79. Article 155 of the E.E.C. Treaty specifies the following functions of the
Commission:
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common mar-
ket, the Commission shall:
-- ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institu-
tions pursuant thereto are applied;
-formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this
Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary;
-have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures
taken by the Council and by the Assembly in the manner provided for in this
Treaty;
-- exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of
the rules laid down by the latter.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 155, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 70; see also Merger Treaty, supra note 77, arts. 9-18, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLE-
MENT, supra note 2, at 246-47.
80. See Merger Treaty, supra note 77, art. 10, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 2, at 246.
81. See e.g., E.E.C. Treaty, art. 87.1, supra note 75. Note that the Commission also
may legislate, acting mostly under power delegated to it by the Council.
82. Noel, The Commission's Power of Initiative, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 123, 124
(1973).
83. The European Parliament consists of representatives of the citizens of the Mem-
ber States. See generally E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 137-53, reprinted in DOCU-
MENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 68-69; Convention on Certain Institutions Common
to the European Communities, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 411 [hereinafter cited as
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Committee8 4 for an advisory opinion before it takes any final deci-
sion. In practice, the Council frequently consults these bodies even
in those cases where it is not under a duty to do so. This institution-
alized consultation also may be regarded as an original feature of the
Community political and legal system. 5
2. Secondary Rules of Adjudication
The European Community's institutional structure is completed
by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, created to
"ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the
law is observed. '8 6 The Court has exclusive and compulsory juris-
diction to resolve various disputes arising on the Community ("inter-
nationar') plane.8 7 There are three main heads of jurisdiction:
(1) Under Article 170 of the E.E.C. Treaty,8 8 a Member State may bring an
action alleging another Member State's failure to fulfill its Treaty obli-
Convention on Common Institutions], reprintedin DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note
2, at 244-45. See also The Act Concerning the Election by Direct Universal Suffrage of
Members of The European Parliament, 19 0. J Eur Comm. (No. L 278) 1 (1976). With
respect to the Council's duty to consult the Parliament, in Case 138/79 Roquette Fr~res
v. Council [1980] E.C.R. 3333, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REPORTER
(CCH) 8703 and Case 139/79 Maizena Gesellschaft mbH v. Council [1980] E.C.R.
3393, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REPORTER (CCH) 8703, the Court
of Justice declared a Council regulation void because, although the Council had asked
the Parliament for its opinion concerning the regulation, the Council adopted the meas-
ure before receiving the Parliament's opinion.
84. The Economic and Social Committee, a permanent part of the E.E.C. institu-
tional structure whose members are appointed by the Council, is composed of represent-
atives of the various sectors of economic and social activity, e.g., producers, farmers,
workers, and representatives of the "general interest." See generally E.E.C. Treaty,
supra note 2, arts. 193-98, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 73-74;
Convention on Common Institutions, supra note 83, art. 5, reprintedin DOCUMENT SUP-
PLEMENT, supra note 2, at 244-45.
85. In addition to this institutionalized consultation, a great variety of unstructured
consultations involving various groups and organizations also may take place. See E.
STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 76, at 52-58.
86. E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 164, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 2, at 70.
87. The jurisdiction of the Court where actions are brought by individuals challeng-
ing unlawful activity by the Community institutions, and where Community law is
invoked by individuals against the national authorities or against other individuals is
addressed infra notes 109-90 and accompanying text.
88. A Member State which considers that another Member State has failed to
fulfil an obligation under this Treaty may bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
Before a Member State brings an action against another Member State for an
alleged infringement of an obligation under this Treaty, it shall bring the matter
before the Commission.
The Commission shall deliver a reasoned opinion after each of the States con-
cerned has been given the opportunity to submit its own case and its observa-
tions on the other party's case both orally and in writing.
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gations; Article 16989 authorizes the Commission to take similar action.
These enforcement actions90 may result in a declaration that the Mem-
ber State has failed to meet its Treaty obligations.
(2) Under Article 173, 9 1 either a Member State or the other institution
(Council or Commission) may bring an action to "review the legality of
acts of the Council and the Commission other than recommendations or
opinions" (i.e., actions to annul binding acts with legal effects).92 If suc-
cessful, the action results in a declaration that the act is void.
93
(3) Under Article 175, 9 4 a Member State or any other institution of the
Community may bring an action alleging the Council's or the Commis-
If the Commission has not delivered an opinion within three months of the
date on which the matter was brought before it, the absence of such opinion shall
not prevent the matter from being brought before the Court of Justice.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 170, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 71.
89. If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obli-
gation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after
giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid
down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 71.
90. The enforcement actions under Article 170 and Article 169 are discussed in T.C.
HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 283-323.
91. The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the
Commission other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose
have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Com-
mission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential proce-
dural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to
its application, or misuse of powers.
The proceedings provided for in this Article shall be instituted within two
months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or,
in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter,
as the case may be.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 71.
92. In Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (the E.R.T.A. case), [1971] E.C.R. 263, 10
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335 (1971), the Court said of the action for annulment under Article
173: "An action for annulment must therefore be available in the case of all measures
adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have
legal effects." Id. at 277, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 357.
93. If the action is well founded, the Court of Justice shall declare the act con-
cerned to be void.
In the case of a regulation, however, the Court of Justice shall, if it considers
this necessary, state which of the effects of the regulation which it has declared
void shall be considered as definitive.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 174, reprinted in DocUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 71. See generally T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 330-85, 431-68.
94. The first and second paragraphs of Article 175 of the E.E.C. Treaty provide:
Should the Council or the Commission, in infringement of this Treaty, fail to
act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Community may bring
an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement established.
The action shall be admissible only if the institution concerned has first been
called upon to act. If, within two months of being so called upon, the institution
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sion's unlawful failure to act on a matter.95
In all these cases, the delinquent Member State or Community insti-
tution is "required to take the necessary measures to comply with the
judgment of the Court of Justice. '96
Although these disputes arise on the Community (international)
plane, the mechanisms for their resolution differ in some fundamen-
tal respects from the dispute settlement mechanisms of more tradi-
tional international law. For example, the exclusive and compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice97-indeed the very existence of a
Court of Justice-the intricacy and comprehensiveness of the vari-
ous types of action, and the vigilant role played by the independent
Commission as "guardian of the Treaties" under Article 169 of the
Treaty, all distinguish the Community's dispute resolution mecha-
nisms from those of traditional international law.
3. The Rule of Recognition of the Community Legal System
As in the case of any well developed legal system, the Commu-
nity legal system is also unified by a complex Rule of Recognition
that specifies many different ultimate sources of law or criteria of
validity. These various sources of law include the Treaties, the legis-
lative and judicial acts of the institutions, international law, general
principles of law pertaining to matters such as human rights and the
concerned has not defined its position, the action may be brought within a fur-
ther period of two months.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 175, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 72.
95. See generally T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 386-412.
96. This language is drawn from Article 171, which pertains to proceedings under
Articles 169 and 170, and from Article 176, which pertains to proceedings under Articles
173 and 175. See DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 71-72. A Member State also
may be able to bring an action for damages against the Community under Article 178
and the second paragraph of Article 215 of the E.E.C. Treaty, although there appears to
be no case in which this has been attempted. Under Article 178:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation
for damage provided for in the second paragraph of Article 215.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 178, reprintedin DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 72. The second paragraph of Article 215 provides:
In the case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance with
the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any
damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their
duties.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 215, reprintedin DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 79. The action for damages under Articles 178 and 215 is discussed generally in T.C.
HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 487-524.
97. Article 219 of the E.E.C. Treaty provides:
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation
or application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those pro-
vided for therein.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 219, reprintedin DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 79.
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concept of legal certainty, and rules common to the national laws of
the Member States.98 Moreover, these criteria of validity are ranked
in a relative order of superiority. Thus, for example, the legislative
acts of the institutions may be invalid because they violate the
Treaty, general principles of human rights,99 or even obligations
under international law that bind the Community.100
B. THE SECOND AND THIRD CONDITIONS: COMMUNITY
OFFICIALS' ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECONDARY RULES AS CRITICAL,
COMMON, PUBLIC STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL BEHAVIOR, AND
GENERAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES OF BEHAVIOR THAT ARE
VALID UNDER THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM'S RULE OF
RECOGNITION
The second condition that is necessary for the existence of a
legal system clearly is satisfied. There is no doubt that the officials of
the system, acting through the various Community institutions-in
particular the Court of Justice-accept the system's secondary Rule
of Recognition and its rules of change and adjudication as critical,
common, public standards of official behavior.' 0 '
98. For a discussion of Hart's Rule of Recognition, see supra notes 35-40 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the "sources of law" in the Community legal system,
see Schermers, The European Court of Justice: Promoter of European Integration, 22 AM.
J. Comp. L. 444, 454-57 (1974). Clearly some of these sources are more applicable to the
legal position of individuals, the other subjects of the Community legal system, than to
that of the Member States-for example, general principles of human rights. The posi-
tion of the individual in the Community legal system is discussed infra notes 109-90 and
accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vor-
ratsstelle ftr Getreide und Futtermittel, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 255
(1972):
In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general prin-
ciples of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights,
whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States,
must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the
Community.
Id. at 1134, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 283.
100. See Joined Cases 21 to 24 International Fruit v. Produktschap voor Groenten en
Fruit, [1972] E.C.R. 1219, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (1975):
The validity, within the meaning of Article 177 of the E.E.C. Treaty, of measures
taken by the institutions may be judged with reference to a provision of interna-
tional law when that provision binds the Community and is capable of confer-
ring on individuals rights which they can invoke before the courts.
Id. at 1229, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 23. Article 177 is discussed infra notes 184-90 and
accompanying text. For a fuller discussion of the relationship of international law-in
particular international agreements-to the Community legal system, see T.C. HARTLEY,
supra note 64, at 172-80; Bebr, Agreements Concluded by the Communities and Their Pos-
sible Direct Effect: From International Fruit Company to Kupferberg, 20 COMM. MKT. L.
REV. 35 (1983).
101. In the present context, i.e., viewing the Community legal system as one with the
Member States as its subjects, the national government officials in the Council may be
viewed more appropriately not as officials of the Community legal system, but rather as
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As in the case of traditional international law, however, there
could be some doubt regarding the third condition, i.e., whether the
rules generally are efficacious. In fact, however, it seems that Mem-
ber States generally do comply with their obligations under Commu-
nity Law. 02 Member States' governments may be willing, of course,
to comply voluntarily with their Community obligations because
they perceive such compliance to be in their mutual self-interest. 10 3
As in any legal regime, however, compliance also is dependent upon
the effectiveness of available dispute settlement and enforcement
mechanisms that remedy and deter breaches of obligations, thus
ensuring compliance (albeit involuntary).' 0 4
At the international level, the remedy under Article 169 of the
E.E.C. Treaty represents a significant innovative technique for the
enforcement of obligations under international law-involving an
independent body in a "watchdog" capacity with possible recourse
to an impartial adjudicatory body with compulsory jurisdiction. Its
effectiveness as an enforcement mechanism is nevertheless subject to
certain limitations. First, the Commission is unable to uncover every
breach of Community obligations by a Member State. Second, even
when the Commission uncovers a breach, political considerations
necessarily enter into its decision as to how to resolve the dispute
most effectively, and the procedure may involve extensive delay.'0 5
representatives of its subjects, the Member States. Officials of the Member States-
including government officials, but particularly the national judiciary-may be regarded,
however, as officials of the Community legal system when they implement Community
Law and apply it to the private individual. The Community legal system is viewed from
this perspective infra notes 109-90 and accompanying text.
102. A precise determination of the degree of compliance by Member States with their
obligations under Community Law would require extensive empirical research and a
complex evaluation of the resulting data, utilizing various "compliance criteria." A
number of "compliance studies" that have been conducted nevertheless tend to support
the conclusion that there is in fact a high level of compliance, initial or eventual, by
Member States. See, e.g., Kellermann, The Netherlands in the Face of its Community
Obligations, 20 COMM. MKT. L. Rnv. 297 (1983); Rasmussen, Denmark in Face of Her
Community Obligations, 19 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 601 (1982); Mastellone, he Judicial
Application of Community Law in ltal, 1976-1980, 19 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 154 (1982);
Audeoued, Berlin & Manin, The Apfplication of Community Law in France. Review of
French Court Decisions from 1974 to 1981, 19 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 290 (1982).
103. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
104. Moreover, effective enforcement mechanisms also help to develop an attitude of
willing, voluntary compliance in that they preserve the integrity of, and develop confi-
dence in, the system as a whole. As may be expected, the Community institutions them-
selves are less inclined to act in breach of Community Law than the Member States.
105. It is noteworthy, for example, that although Article 169 of the E.E.C. Treaty
requires the Commission to take action when it considers that a Member State is in
breach of a Treaty obligation ("[I]t shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after
giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations."), the Commission
nevertheless possesses discretion as to when it will bring the matter before the Court of
Justice ("If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid
down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.").
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Moreover, even where a successful action is brought against a Mem-
ber State in the Court of Justice, compliance with the Court's judg-
ment depends, under Article 171 of the Treaty, upon the "good
faith" of the Member State; the Court does not possess institutional
means to enforce the judgment.10 6
In addition to the procedure under Article 169, and probably
more importantly, private individuals can enforce Member States'
obligations by way of actions in their national courts against the
national authorities of Member States. In furtherance of such a pro-
cess, the Court of Justice has recognized extensively the "direct
effect" of Community Law.10 7 As the Court stated in the famous
decision of Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen. "The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their
rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the supervi-
sion entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the Com-
mission and of the Member States."108
The Community legal system's penetration within the Member
States, and the position of the private individual under Community
Law are the foci of the following section of this Article.
For a more detailed discussion, see T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 283-305, especially
291-302.
106. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. The Commission, however, does
attempt to ensure that the Member States take the necessary steps to comply with the
Court's judgment without delay. See, e.g., Answer of the Commission to W.Q. 988/83,
26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 335) 34 (1983). If necessary, the Commission may bring a
further enforcement action under Article 169 for a Member State's failure to fulfill its
obligations under Article 171. See, e.g., Case 48/71 Commission v. Italy [1972] E.C.R.
527, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 699 (1972); Cases 24/80R and 97/80R Commission v. France
[1980] E.C.R. 1319, 32 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 25 (1981); see also FOURTEENTH GENERAL
REPORT ON THE AcTIvITIs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1980 301-07 (1981).
107. For a discussion of the direct effect of Community Law, see infra notes 132-54
and accompanying text.
108. [1963] E.C.R. 1, 13, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105, 130 (1963). For a description of the
case, see infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the impor-
tance of such private enforcement of Members States' obligations by private individuals
relative to the enforcement procedure under Article 169, see Stein, Lawyers, Judges and
the Making ofa Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1981). The following
statistics give some indication of the relative importance of these mechanisms: as of
December 31, 1982, 211 cases were brought by the Commission under Articles 169 and
93 (Article 93 is an analogous procedure applying specifically in the context of state aids)
as compared with 1,037 initiated by individuals and resulting in a reference under Article
177 (although, of course, not all of these involved disputes between private individuals
and the national authorities of Member States). See SYNOPSIS OF THE WORK OF THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1982 14, table 2 (1983). As of
the same date, only two cases had been brought by a Member State under Article 170.
Id. The preliminary ruling procedure under Article 177 is described infra notes 184-90
and accompanying text.
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III
THE EXISTENCE OF THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM:
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AS THE SUBJECTS OF THE
COMMUNITY POLITICAL AND LEGAL ORDER AND THE
PENETRATION OF THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM
INTO THE MEMBER STATES
A. THE COMMUNITY CONSTITUTION
As demonstrated above, 10 9 even viewed from the limited per-
spective of the traditional subjects of international law-the sover-
eign Member States-the European Community constitutes an
advanced, international political order with a correspondingly well-
developed legal system. But it is only by viewing the Community
political and legal order from the perspective of its other- subjects,
private individuals, that its true nature and full extent are
revealed.110 Although it is true that traditional international law
also may seek to modify the legal position of private individuals, "'
there are two relevant, fundamental distinctions between the objec-
tives of Community Law and those of more traditional international
law.
First, the legal position of individuals is modified not just by the
Treaties themselves, but also by the exercise of governmentalpowers
conferred upon the Community institutions by the Treaties. Second,
the Treaties and the powers they confer are concerned with modify-
ing the legal position of individuals over an extremely wide range of
economic and social activities.
The Court of Justice identified the unique nature of the Com-
munity political and legal order-an order in which private individ-
uals are its subjects and also are involved actively in the law-making
process' 12-- quite early when it considered the "spirit" of the E.E.C.
109. See supra notes 66-108 and accompanying text.
110. The European Community's concern for private individuals is manifested in the
Preamble to the E.E.C. Treaty and the statement of objectives in Article 2. The Pream-
ble, in relevant part, states that the Member States have decided to create a European
Economic Community:
Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe,
Resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by com-
mon action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe,
Affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement of
the living and working conditions of their peoples, ...
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, preamble, reprintedin DocuMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note
2, at 40. The text of Article 2 of the E.E.C. Treaty is reproduced supra note 68.
111. See the companion article by Professor Janis in this issue, and supra text accom-
panying note 65.
112. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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Treaty. In the Van Gend en Loos case,' 13 the Court described the
essential features of a veritable "Community Constitution" when it
stated:
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market,
the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Com-
munity, implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely cre-
ates mutual obligations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed
by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to
peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institu-
tions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member
States and also their citizens. Furthermore, it must be noted that the nation-
als of the states brought together in the Community are called upon to coop-
erate in the functioning of this Community through the intermediary of the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.
114
In the view of the Court of Justice, the Treaty's conferment of
sovereign powers upon Community institutions to regulate the com-
munity of states and to govern the Community "citizens" '" 5 is the
result of a transfer of powers from the states to the Community; this
transfer of powers entails a permanent limitation of the Member
States' sovereign rights. In other words, a new polity has resulted
from a reordering of the inward-looking governmental powers of the
sovereign over its traditional subjects-the private individual-as
well as from a limitation upon the outward-looking sovereignty of
the state as a member of the international community of states." 6
113. [1963] E.C.R. 1, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105 (1964).
114. Id at 12, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 129 (emphasis added). Advocate-General
LaGrange referred to this "constitutional" nature of the E.E.C. Treaty in Costa: "It is
certainly true to say that the Treaty of Rome has, in a sense, the character of a genuine
constitution, the constitution of the Community ... ." [1964] E.C.R. at 605, 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 442 (1964). For articles by two leading authorities viewing the Treaty as a
"constitution," see Stein, supra note 108; Bridge, American Analogues in the Law of the
European Community, 11 ANGLO-AM. 130 (1982). The evolution of the Court's case law
and the various doctrines discussed in this section are traced in J. USHER, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW, THE IRREVERSIBLE TRANSFER? 11-42 (1981).
115. This of course means that private individuals are also the subjects of secondary
power-conferring rules in the Community legal system. See supra notes 70-85 and
accompanying text, and the discussion accompanying notes 109-90.
116. This transfer of sovereign power, with its attendant limitation of Member State
sovereignty, was noted by the Court in the Van Gend en Loos case: "The conclusion to
be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of international
law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their
nationals." [1963] E.C.R. at 12, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R& at 129 (1964) (emphasis added). It
was confirmed one year later in Costa:
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its
own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the
international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemmingfrom a limita-
tion of sovereignty or a transfer ofpowers from the States to the Community, the
Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields,
1984]
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B. PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL FROM UNLAWFUL
COMMUNITY ACTIVITY
It is clear, therefore, that by creating the European Community,
the Member States "have thus created a body of law which binds
both their nationals and themselves."' 17 If private individuals are to
be the subjects of the Community political and legal order, and if
their legal position is to be affected by the exercise of governmental
powers by the Community institutions, then the Rule of Law
requires that they be accorded judicial protection against the
improper exercise of those powers. The system of judicial remedies
provided by the E.E.C. Treaty is designed to ensure such effective
judicial protection of the individual. This protection takes both
"direct" and "indirect" forms.
Aggrieved individuals may bring certain direct actions against
unlawful Community activity: for annulment under Article 173,118
for failure to act under Article 175,119 and for damages under Arti-
and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and them-
selves.
[1964] E.C.R. at 593, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 455 (1964) (emphasis added). The Court
continued: "The transfer by the Statesfrom their domestic legal system to the Community
legalsystem of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it aperma-
nent limitation of their sovereign rights ...... Id at 594, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 456
(emphasis added). One leading authority has described the consequences for British con-
stitutional theory in the following manner. He contrasts the "constitutional change"
resulting, for example, from any attempt to incorporate the European Convention on
Human Rights, with the change brought about by British accession to the Community:
An endeavour, for example, to incorporate the European Convention on Human
Rights, and to entrench the. measure of incorporation, could rightly raise the
traditional arguments about self-limitation. It would do so since, although such
a step would amount to a constitutional change, it would only be a change within
a particular constitutional system, which otherwise retains its original institu-
tional shape. The change in relation to the Communities is of a different kind. It
is not simply a question of the magnitude of the change--that the consequences of
the rules of the Treaty of Rome and of the derived Community legislation are far
more pervasive throughout the whole legal system. Rather, what is in question is
a change of the whole constitution. That resultsfrom what has been called the "re-
shuffling" of the mode of exercise of State powers agreed among the Member
States. It can indeed be said that two constitutional systems co-exist on the terri-
tory of each Member State. Outside the ambit of Community competences
(which is not a finite area) the original pre-1973 constitution continues unaf-
fected. Within those bounds however a different situation exists.
Mitchell, What happened to the Constitution on 1st January 1973?, CAMBRIAN L. REv. 69,
81 (1980) (emphasis added).
117. Costa, [1964] E.C.R. at 593, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 455 (1964).
118. Under the second paragraph of Article 173:
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceed-
ings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which,
although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is
of direct and individual concern to the former.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 71.
119. Under the third paragraph of Article 175:
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des 178 and 215.120 In addition to these limited remedies, which are
frequently unavailable because of the strict admissibility require-
ments,121 the individual is in principle assured effective indirect pro-
tection. Thus, an individual may challenge the validity of a
Community act in a national court that may, and if a court of last
resort must, request the European Court of Justice to give a prelimi-
nary ruling on the matter under Article 177 of the Treaty.
22
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the preced-
ing paragraphs, complain to the Court of Justice that an institution of the Com-
munity has failed to address to that person any act other than a recommendation
or an opinion.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 175, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 72.
120. For the relevant portions of the texts of Articles 178 and 215, see supra note 96.
The remedies available to Member States and Community institutions are discussed
supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
121. Apart from time limits, a private individual must satisfy certain other require-
ments for an action to be admissible. First, under the second paragraph of Article 173, a
private individual may challenge a decision that is actually addressed to him. In addi-
tion, he also may challenge an act that is not a decision addressed to him, provided:
(a) the act is in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person (pri-
vate individual or Member State); and (b) the act is a "decision. . . of direct and indi-
vidual concern" to him. At the risk of generalization, one can say that the Court has
interpreted this language to mean that an individual may not challenge a general norma-
tive act, e.g., a true regulation, but may be able to challenge an act, even if called a
regulation or decision addressed to a Member State, if it is in effect really a "disguised"
decision addressed to him or a "bundle" of such disguised decisions addressed to individ-
uals including the applicant. See generally, e.g., T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 352-77;
Harding, The Review of E.E. C. Regulations and Decisions, 19 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 311
(1982).
Second, under the third paragraph of Article 175, a private individual may only 'chal-
lenge an omission to adopt an act that would, if adopted, be "addressed" to him. For a
discussion of the Court's interpretation of this term, see T. C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at
410-12.
Finally, neither Article 178 nor the second paragraph of Article 215 seems to contain
any express limitation on the admissibility of actions by private individuals. It appears,
however, that the Court will rule an action for damages inadmissible when the national
court would in principle be in a position to grant the applicant a remedy against the
national authorities for his claim, e.g., to recover a sum of money equal to monies paid or
denied. In the case of an action for damages, moreover, it may be very difficult for the
applicant to succeed on the merits, even if the action is admissible. Thus, where the act
in question is a "legislative act involving choices of economic policy," the Community
will be held liable for damages only where there has been a "sufficiently flagrant breach
of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual," which will only be the case
in exceptional circumstances. The action for damages is discussed further in T.C. HART-
LEY, supra note 64, at 505-46 and in Jones, The Non-Contractual Liability of the E.EC
and the Availability of an .41ternative Remedy in the National Courts, 1981 LEGAL ISSUES
OF EUR. INTEGRATION 1.
122. The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 72. The full text of Article 177 is reproduced infra note 184. It seems generally to be
accepted that, although in theory a national court that is not a court of last resort may
itself declare a Community act invalid because it is not bound to refer the matter to the
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C. PENETRATION OF COMMUNITY LAW AND THE COMMUNITY
LEGAL SYSTEM INTO THE MEMBER STATES:
APPLICATION OF HART'S MODEL OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM
The preceding discussion presupposes, of course, that Commu-
nity Law and the Community legal system in fact do penetrate into
the Member States so as to affect the legal position of the individual.
Effective penetration into the municipal sphere is by no means cer-
tain in the case of traditional international law. In contrast to tradi-
tional international law, Community Law clearly penetrates the
municipal sphere. The following discussion will attempt to demon-
strate why Hart's theoretical model is particularly helpful in describ-
ing this phenomenon.
L Statement of the Issues
The existence and extent of international law's penetration of
the municipal sphere depends on the attitude of the municipal courts
in resolving three central issues. First, are the municipal courts pre-
pared to recognize an international norm as such as a "source of
law," i.e., is the legal system "open" to international law? Or, do the
municipal courts only recognize domestic law norms as a "source of
law," i.e., is the legal system "closed" to international law? This tra-
ditionally is viewed as relating to the method of "incorporating" or
"receiving" international law into the municipal legal system. In
Hart's terminology, the question may be stated as follows: May
international law as such be one of the "sources" of law or a "crite-
rion of validity" accepted by the system's officials as part of the Rule
of Recognition? If the municipal legal system is "closed" to interna-
tional law, the norm of international law can be applied by the
courts only after it has been "transformed" into a norm of municipal
law. The following two issues are presented, therefore, only if the
municipal legal system is "open" to international law.
Second, if a norm of international law may indeed be applied as
such by the municipal judge, what are the effects of that application
in the municipal legal system? In particular, does the norm directly
alter the legal position of individuals? In traditional parlance, a
treaty provision, for example, may be directly invoked by individuals
only if it is "self-executing."
Finally, what is the status of a norm of international law that
has been incorporated as such within the municipal legal system?
Court of Justice under Article 177, this would nevertheless be improper, and the Euro-
pean Court in fact has proposed that Community Law be amended to preclude this pos-
sibility. See T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 265-66.
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This involves consideration of the primacy of one norm over the
other in the case of any conflict between an international law norm
and a municipal law norm. In Hart's terminology, the question con-
cerns the relative position of the various criteria of validity or
sources of law on a scale of superiority in the Rule of Recognition.
This question may be presented in a number of different contexts,
either at the national level or, in a federal system, also at the state
level. Those contexts include the status of the international law
norm relative to prior legislation, implementing legislation, subse-
quent legislation, and constitutional law norms, e.g., guarantees of
fundamental human rights.
2 Resolution of the Issues by the Monist and Dualist Schools of
Thought
In general, monist theory regards international law and munici-
pal law as part of the same system-law in general-while dualist
thought regards them as two distinct legal systems with international
law being intrinsically dfferent in nature from municipal law.123 The
two schools have formulated different propositions of law embody-
ing the different theoretical solutions to the three issues discussed
above.
a. The Incorporation of International Law
In monist theory, international law is clearly a source of law for
a municipal court by virtue of being, by its very nature, part of the
same system as municipal law. A variation of dualist theory that one
may term "weak dualism" also recognizes international law as a
source of law. This is so, however, only because the sovereign has
decreed so and thus has given the municipal judge a mandate to
have recourse to international law as a direct source of law-the
"adoption" theory.124 In a more extreme version of dualism, which
one may term "strong dualism," a rule of international law is never
available to the municipal judge as such, but in each specific instance
must be converted into a norm of municipal law before it can ever be
a rule for the court--the "transformation" theory.125 Naturally, an
international tribunal may be expected to be inspired by the monist
philosophy on the question of incorporation, while state practice
may vary considerably, some states being monist and others espous-
123. For a more detailed discussion of monism and dualism, see D.P. O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-46 (1970); J.G. STARKE, supra note 65, at 82-84.
124. See, e.g., D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 123, at 49-50.
125. Id at 49.
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ing either weak or strong dualism. 126
b. The Effect of Incorporated International Law
Where international law is available to the municipal judge as a
source of law (monism or weak dualism), a norm of international
law may be invoked by private individuals in a suitable case, e.g., a
self-executing treaty provision. A monist, international tribunal and
a municipal court espousing monism or weak dualism, however,
may resolve the question whether a particular treaty provision is
"self-executing" in a different manner because the question may be
raised in either the international or the municipal forum. Under
strong dualism, of course, there can never be a question of individu-
als invoking a norm of international law as such.
c. The Status of Incorporated International Law
In a weakly dualist jurisdiction, and even in a monist jurisdic-
tion, the question of primacy may be resolved in favor of either
international law or municipal law.127 Under strong dualism, how-
ever, there never can be a conflict between municipal law and inter-
national law in the municipal sphere, because international law as
such is not a source of law to begin with, and hence municipal law
always will be applied. Even adherents of strong dualism would
concede, however, that international law may be held to be supreme
in its own sphere. State practice also varies considerably on this
issue, while a monist, international tribunal always may be expected
to recognize the primacy of international law in practice.
It should be noted that international law does not require a state
to adopt any particular attitude towards the reception of interna-
126. The actual practice is more nuanced than may appear from this discussion. A
state, for example, may recognize customary international law as a "source of law" while
denying such a status to treaty law, as in British practice. For an overview of states'
practices as to the operation of international law within the municipal sphere, see id at
56-79; J.G. STARKE, supra note 65, at 89-102.
127. In the United States, for example, treaties are automatically incorporated as part
of the "supreme Law of the Land" by virtue of Article VI, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, i.e., in Hart's terminology, they are part of the U.S. legal system's Rule of Recogni-
tion. Broadly speaking, "self-executing" treaties-in the strict sense of Article VI, clause
2 "treaties"--and executive agreements prevail over prior inconsistent federal legislation
but not over subsequent federal legislation or fundamental rights guaranteed in the Con-
stitution. They do override, however, State constitutions and State legislation, prior or
subsequent. See D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 123, at 62-65; J.G. STARKE, supra note 65,
at 96-99. On the confusion between the two distinct concepts of incorporation and the
self-executing nature of treaties in the United States, see Winter, Direct Applicability and
Direct Effect, Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 CoMM. MKT. L.
REv. 425, 427-28 (1972).
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tional law into the municipal sphere. A state may perform its obliga-
tions under international law by correctly "transforming"
international rules that are intended to have effects within the
municipal sphere. Thus, these theoretical distinctions generally will
have practical legal consequences only in the case of incorrect
"transformation."
One of the great merits of Hart's theory is its recognition that
the question whether a particular body of law and a legal system
exist among a particular social group may be viewed as a question of
fact, and not just as a proposition of law. Thus, international law
exists in fact as part of the legal system of a state if the officials of
that state accept it as part of the Rule of Recognition that they use.
International law does not exist in fact as part of that legal system if
it is not part of the Rule of Recognition. This is so despite whatever
consequences international law may draw-as a proposition of inter-
national law-from any conflict, e.g., invalidity of a conflicting
municipal norm.
This Article does not undertake a detailed examination of state
practice among the Member States of the European Community
regarding these various issues in the context of traditional interna-
tional law. It should be noted, however, that the various constitu-
tional laws show considerable variation.1 28
128. Some Member States are strongly dualist, so that international treaties can never
be a source of law as such-for example, the United Kingdom. Italy and the Federal
Republic of Germany, which also sometimes are cited as examples of "strongly dualist"
jurisdictions, may be classified more accurately as "weakly dualist" in that an act of
adoption may result in application of a treaty provision as such. See further the debate
between Waelbroeck and March Hunnings in Waelbroeck, Enforceability ofthe EEC-
EFTA Free Trade Agreements: A Reply, 3 EuR. L. RlEv. 27, 27-29 (1978), and March
Hunnings, Enforceability of the EEC-EFT.A Free Trade Agreements: A Rejoinder, 3 EUR.
L. RFv. 278, 278-79 (1978). Among those Member States that incorporate international
treaty law as such as a source of law without the need for specific transformation, a state
may accord either only limited supremacy to treaties (e.g., Luxembourg-treaties prevail
only over prior legislation) or only accord supremacy on conditions (e.g., reciprocity, as
in France).
Member States also vary in the extent to which they explicitly recognize the possibility
of conferring powers upon international organizations. This possibility is recognized in
the Netherlands, Luxembourg (temporary delegation only), Belgium, Germany, France,
and Italy-the constitutions of the last two countries were drafted with traditional inter-
national organizations in mind. There is no explicit recognition in the United Kingdom.
Even in the Dutch constitution, which is perhaps the most "internationalist," and
which not only provides for the supremacy of treaties over the constitution and subse-
quent legislation, but which also envisages the conferment of administrative, legislative,
and judicial powers on international organizations, the rule that treaties prevail over
inconsistent Dutch law applies only in the case of treaties that a Dutch court declares to
be self-executing. Thus, a Dutch court could interpret a treaty restrictively and so
deprive it of its supreme status under the constitution. For a fuller survey of the constitu-
tional position in the original six Member States, see Bebr, Law ofthe European Commu-
nities and Municipal Law, 34 MOD. L. REv. 481, 485-87 (1971); Sasse, The Common
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3. Resolution of the Issues by the European Court of Justice as
Propositions of Community Law
In light of the fact that the Court of Justice is the judicial organ
of what it views as a new and original political and legal order that
differs from traditional forms of international law in certain funda-
mental respects, 29 the legal propositions that the Court has articu-
lated in resolving the various issues relating to the penetration of
Community Law into the municipal sphere cause no great surprise.
In some respects these solutions are similar to those that any interna-
tional tribunal could be expected to reach. In other respects, how-
ever, they go beyond the present state of international law and reflect
the original nature of the Community as a new political order with
its own legal system and "Community Constitution" whose subjects
are not only the Member States but also private individuals.
a. The Incorporation of Community Law and the Community
Legal System into the Member States: National Officials Are
to Apply the Rule of Recognition of the Community Legal
System
The starting point for analyzing the question of the penetration
of Community Law into the Member States is the proposition that
Community Law and the Community legal system apply as such on
the territory of a Member State, merely as a result of the Member
State's entry into the Community. There is no doubt that this is the
view of the European Court.130
In Hart's terms, the Rule of Recognition used by the Commu-
nity officials, in particular the Court of Justice, should be used also
by the national officials-in particular the courts-of the Member
States. National law continues to apply outside this sphere of Com-
munity Law. Thus, viewed from the perspective of the national offi-
cials of a Member State, one could say that, in the view of the Court
of Justice, the Community legal system with its Rule of Recognition
applies alongside the separate national system, or alternatively, that
there exists one legal system with a correspondingly more complex
Rule of Recognition of which the Community legal system is a
part.' 3' On either view, the national officials, when acting in the
Market: Between International and Municipal Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695, 705-13, 740-41
(1966).
129. See supra notes 3 & 113-16 and accompanying text.
130. See, eg., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
131. One commentator apparently believes that within the Member States there are
two Rules of Recognition in operation; he asserts that Hart seems to deny that this is
possible. See Starr, supra note 5, at 263-66. An analogous problem presumably would
be presented, however, in the case of any federal system when viewed from the perspec-
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sphere of Community Law, also could be viewed as Community
officials.
Upon entry into the Community, the Member States accept the
Community political and legal order with its "Community Constitu-
tion." The original nature of this Community order determines its
automatic "incorporation" and the various consequences thereof
with respect to the effect of Community Law and its status relative to
any conflicting national provisions.
b. The Effects of Community Law Within the Member States
As discussed previously, 32 although international law as such
may be recognized as a source of law, its particular effects may vary
depending on the particular norm in question. Thus, only certain
treaty provisions, i.e. "self-executing" treaty provisions, are capable
of modifying directly the legal position of individuals. The same is
true in the case of provisions of Community Law, although here one
must make a distinction between the various sources of law. The
following discussion will be confined to examining the effects of pro-
visions of the Treaties and those of Community legislation-regula-
tions, directives, and decisions addressed to Member States.
Although the terminology of the Court is not without ambigu-
ity, it seems that if a provision of Community Law has "direct
effects" it directly modifies the legal position of individuals.1 33 A
particular provision of Community Law-whether imposing a nega-
tive obligation (a prohibition) or a positive obligation (a duty to take
action)-may produce direct effects only if its wording satisfies cer-
tain criteria. The Court has refined the test for direct effects, and the
various criteria may be summarized as follows:
(i) the provision is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) it is unconditional, and in particular its operation is not dependent
upon:
(a) further action to be taken by a Community institution or national
authority within a certain time; or
(b) a discretionary decision-making power within the control of an
independent authority, e.g., Community institution, or national
authorities of a Member State. 134
tive of the officials of the state legal system, and the present writer does not take Hart to
deny the possibility that within a given territory there could apply two legal systems.
Moreover, Starr appears to overlook the flexibility and complexity of Hart's Rule of Rec-
ognition, in particular the fact that it may contain various sources of law ranked in a
relative order of superiority. In any event, if there is any merit in Starr's objection, it is
not of a fundamental nature.
132. See supra pp. 32 & 34.
133. This appears to be analogous to the "self-executing" nature of a treaty provision
in traditional international law parlance.
134. See T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 190-97.
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Such direct effects may take two forms. First, direct effects may arise
in the relationship between the individual and the national authori-
ties of a Member State; these "vertical direct effects" may involve:
(a) obligations of the national authorities and correlative rights of
the individual or, (b) obligations of the individual and correlative
rights of the national authorities. Second, direct effects may be pro-
duced in the relationship between individuals; this may be termed
"horizontal direct effects."' 35 The various kinds of Community Law
may vary in the type of direct effects they can produce.
(i) Regulations: "Directly Applicable" Community Legislation.
The first type of Community Law considered will be the regulation,
the most powerful type of legislation the Community institutions
may issue. Article 189 of the E.E.C. Treaty states: "[A] regulation
shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States." The term "directly appli-
cable" in Article 189 appears to mean not only that a regulation
requires no further implementing measures to perfect its normative
character-it is "legally perfect"-but moreover that, unless author-
ized by the regulation itself, any transformation into a national law
by the national authorities would indeed be improper.136
That further norm creation is both unnecessary and usually
would be improper does not mean, however, that the provisions of a
regulation always produce direct effects. The better view is that the
provisions of "directly applicable" regulations may produce direct
effects only if they satisfy the various criteria summarized earlier. 37
A regulation is, however, capable of producing either vertical or hor-
izontal direct effects. 138
(ii) Treaty Provisions. Many Treaty provisions envisage and
require further norm creation, i.e., transformation into national law
in the form of implementing measures taken by the Member States.
The Treaties do not state whether their provisions may have direct
effects. In a great many cases, however, private individuals directly
have invoked Treaty provisions in the national courts when a Mem-
ber State either has implemented a Treaty provision incorrectly or
has failed to adopt any implementing measures whatsoever. The
Court of Justice has not hesitated to recognize the direct effects of
135. The Court itself does not seem to have used the terms "vertical" or "horizontal"
in referring to the direct effects of provisions of Community Law. The terminology used
in this Article is, however, quite coherent and familiar to Community lawyers.
136. See generally T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 201-04.
137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. See also T.C. HARTLEY, supra note
64, at 198-201.
138. See T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 213.
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Treaty provisions when the relevant criteria have been satisfied. 139
The Court first recognized the direct effects of a Treaty provi-
sion in the Van Gend en Loos140 case, where a private individual
brought an action in the Dutch courts alleging that the Netherlands
had imposed a customs duty in breach of its obligations under Arti-
cle 12 of the E.E.C. Treaty.' 41 The Dutch national court asked the
Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the
E.E.C. Treaty142 concerning the effects of Article 12. The Court
stated that, in order to determine the effects of provisions of the
E.E.C. Treaty, it is "necessary to consider the spirit, the general
scheme and the wording of those provisions."' 43 After considering
the spirit of the E.E.C. Treaty' 44 and concluding that "the Commu-
nity constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member
States but also their nationals,"' 45 the Court declared:
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore
not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise
not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of
obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals
as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the
Community.14
6
In short, a Treaty provision always may produce direct effects in
an appropriate case due to the very nature of the Community.
Whether a particular Treaty provision in fact does produce such a
direct effect will depend on its place in the general scheme of the
139. The Court's terminology sometimes has been confusing because it has referred to
Treaty provisions as being "directly applicable." The Court's apparent use of this term,
in the context of Treaty provisions, to mean "directly effective" has been criticized as
engendering confusion with the "direct applicability" of regulations under Article 189,
which is a quite different concept. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 127, at 435; Easson, The
"Direct Effect" of/EE.C. Directives, 28 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 319 (1979).
140. [1963] E.C.R. 1, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105 (1963).
141. Member-States shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new
customs duties on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect,
and from increasing those which they already apply in their trade with each
other.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 12, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 43.
142. For the text of Article 177 of the E.E.C. Treaty, see infra note 184. The Article
177 procedure is discussed in detail infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
143. [1963] E.C.R. at 12, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 129 (1963).
144. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
145. [1963] E.C.R. at 12, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 129 (1963).
146. Id, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 129 (emphasis added). An example of a right
"expressly granted by the Treaty" is to be found in Article 48 of the E.E.C. Treaty (free
movement of workers), while Article 85 and Article 86 of the E.E.C. Treaty (prohibiting
anti-competitive practices) are examples of obligations directly imposed by the Treaty
upon individuals.
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Treaty and its wording. 147 In the Van Gend en Loos case the Court
declared that Article 12 "must be interpreted as producing direct
effects and creating individual rights which national courts must
protect."148
The Van Gend en Loos case involved the "vertical direct effects"
of a Treaty provision-an individual brought an action against the
national authorities-and recognized that individuals also may pos-
sess rights correlative to the "obligations which the Treaty imposes
in a clearly defined way upon. . . the Member States .... ,"149 In
subsequent cases, the Court recognized that certain Treaty provi-
sions also may affect directly the relationship of individuals inter se,
i.e., they may have "horizontal direct effects." 150
(iii) Non-"Directoy Applicable" Community Legislation: Direc-
tives and DecisionsAddressed to Member States. In contrast to regu-
lations, Article 189 does not provide that directives and decisions
addressed to Member States are "directly applicable." Thus, as in
the case of many Treaty provisions, further norm creation-transfor-
mation into a national norm in the form of national implementing
measures by the Member States-is both envisaged and required.15'
Therefore, just as in the case of Treaty provisions, a Member State
147. It now seems that the "wording" is the more important criterion. See supra note
134 and accompanying text.
148. [1963] E.C.R. at 13, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 130-31.
149. Id at 12, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 129.
150. See, e.g., Case 43/75 Defrenne v. SABENA, [1976] E.C.R. 455, 18 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 98 (1976), in which the Court recognized that, in the case of certain kinds of direct
discrimination, "which may be identified solely by reference to the criteria laid down by
Article 119 .... [iun such situation, at least, Article 119 is directly applicable and may
thus give rise to individual rights which the courts must protect." Id at 473-74, 18
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 123-24. (An air hostess sued her employer in a Belgian labor court,
seeking compensation on the ground that she was paid a lower salary than colleagues
doing identical work, and that such discrimination was contrary to Article 119.) Article
119 of the E.E.C. Treaty provides:
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain
the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay
for equal work.
For the purpose of this Article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or minimum
wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which
the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment from his
employer.
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means:
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the
basis of the same unit of measurement;
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 119, reprinted in DocUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 65.
151. A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Mem-
ber State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods.
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either may implement the directive or decision incorrectly or fail to
adopt any implementing measures whatsoever.
Here too, the Court has recognized that, in an appropriate case,
the provisions of a directive or a decision addressed to a Member
State may produce vertical direct effects that an individual may
invoke against the delinquent national authorities. 152 The Court
apparently was motivated primarily by the consideration that "the
effectiveness ('l'effet utile') of such a measure would be weakened if
the nationals of that state could not invoke [the obligation imposed
on the Member State] in the courts and the national courts could not
take it into consideration as part of Community Law."' 53 Whether
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189, reprinted in DocUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 73.
152. See the evolution of the Court's case law in Case 9/70 Franz Grad v. Finanzamt
Traunstein, [1970] E.C.R. 825, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (1971) (provisions in a Council
directive, which prohibited Member States from applying a system of specific taxes
together with the common value added tax system, were directly effective where the date
on which the obligation in the Council decision became effective was laid down by a
Council directive); Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, 15 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 1 (1975) (A Dutch national denied entry into the United Kingdom brought an
action in the U.K. courts relying on Article 48 of the E.E.C. Treaty and a Council direc-
tive that provided that "measures taken on the grounds of public policy or public security
shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned." The
Court held Article 48 and the provision in the Council directive to be directly effective.);
Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, [1979] E.C.R. 1629, 27 Comm. Mkt. L.
R. 96 (1980/1) (The Court held provisions of a Council directive on the classification,
packaging, and labeling of solvents to be directly effective after the deadline for their
implementation had expired. The Court, however, found similar provisions in a Council
directive on varnishes not to be directly effective because the deadline had not expired.
Therefore, the defendant, who had complied with the provisions of both directives and
who was being prosecuted in a criminal court for infringement of labeling requirements
under Italian law, was able to rely upon the provisions of the former but not the latter in
his defense.).
153. Franz Grad supra note 152, [1970] E.C.R. at 837, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 23.
Even provisions of directives and decisions addressed to Member States, which are not
"directly effective," presumably may have significant legal consequences, governed not
by Community Law but by national law. For example, if the national authorities adopt
measures under the purported authority of a provision in a directive or a decision
addressed to a Member State, which is not directly effective, a national doctrine of ultra
vires may render those measures void in national law and thereby indirectly ensure the
proper application of Community Law. The Court seems to have contemplated this pos-
sibility in Case 111/75 Impresa Construzioni Comm. Quirino Mazzalai v. Ferovia del
Renon, [1976] E.C.R. 657, 19 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105 (1977/1):
In addition, regardless of the effects of the directive, in cases such as the present,
an interpretation of the directive may be helpful to the national court so as to
ensure that the law adopted for the implementation of the directive is interpreted
and applied in a manner which conforms to the requirements of Community
law. (Friedrich Haaga GmbH, Case 32/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1201).
Id at 665, 19 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 116. In the Mazzalal case, the Court of Justice was
asked to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of a provision in a Council direc-
tive on the harmonization of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes.
The Italian government contended that the Court had no jurisdiction because, inter alia,
the directive was not directly effective. The Court held that it possessed jurisdiction in
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provisions in a directive or a decision addressed to a Member State
also may produce horizontal direct effects remains to be decided. 154
c. The Status of Community Law in the Rule of Recognition
Used by the National Officials
Despite the lack of any explicit provision in the Treaties that
provides for the supremacy of Community Law over national law in
the event of a conflict, the Court of Justice has taken the view that
such a rule is to be implied and thus unequivocally has recognized
the absolute supremacy of directly effective Community Law. 155
Directly effective provisions of Community Law prevail over every
kind of national law, both prior and subsequent legislation, 156 as
well as guarantees of fundamental human rights in the national con-
stitutions.157 Moreover, a national judge must be permitted to recog-
nize the supremacy of Community Law immediately and
any event to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of acts of the institutions. The
same may be equally true of other non-directly effective provisions of Community Law.
154. This issue is discussed in Easson, Can Directives Impose Obligations on Individu-
als?, 4 EuR. L. REv. 67 (1979).
155. See T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 219-21. For an early discussion of the
"implied" rule of conflict in the E.E.C. Treaty, see Sasse, supra note 128, at 730.
156. See Costa, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425 (1964). In Costa, the
plaintiff brought an action in an Italian court, challenging his electricity bill, on the
grounds that the law nationalizing the electric power industry violated both the Italian
Constitution and various provisions of the E.E.C. Treaty. The Italian government con-
tended that the reference by the Italian judge to the Court of Justice under Article 177
was "absolutely inadmissible" because the Italian judge was bound to apply Italian law.
The Court of Justice ruled, however, that the reference was admissible because "a subse-
quent unilateral measure cannot take precedence over Community law .... " Id at
599, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 460.
157. See Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle
fur Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 255 (1972):
Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the
validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have
an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The validity
of such measures can only be judged in the light of Community law. In fact, the
law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because of
its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however framed, without
being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of
the Community itself being called in question. Therefore the validity of a Com-
munity measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allega-
tions that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the
constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.
Id. at 1134, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 283. Fundamental rights are guaranteed, however,
by Community Law itself, which is "inspired by the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States." See supra note 99. Therefore, the Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft Court held that a Council regulation that required importers and exporters to
lodge a deposit as a condition for obtaining an import or export license and that provided
for its forfeiture if the transaction was not carried out, could not be challenged on the
grounds that it contravened certain fundamental rights guaranteed in the German Basic
Law. Moreover, the Court found that the regulation did not contravene any analogous
guarantee in Community law. The point is that the validity of Community Law may not
be challenged on the ground that it conflicts with national law of whatever nature.
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unconditionally. Consequently, any procedures of national law that
may impede this immediate and unconditional application-for
example, a requirement that the matter be referred to a national con-
stitutional court for a declaration that the conflicting national law is
unconstitutional-are incompatible with Community Law.158
The full implications of the supremacy principle and of the new
polity are apparent from the case of Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato v. Simmenthal 159 In that case, the Court, no longer con-
tent with asserting the supremacy of Community Law as an abstract
principle, articulated various propositions of law regarding Commu-
nity Law's concrete effect before the national judge. In addition to
noting that Community Law requires that the national judge be able
to recognize the supremacy of Community Law immediately and
unconditionally, 60 the Court stated:
Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of the precedence of
Community law, the relationship between provisions of the Treaty and
directly applicable measures of the institutions on the one hand and the
national law of the Member States on the other is such that those provisions
and measures not only by their entry into force render automatically inappli-
cable any conflicting provision of current national law but-in so far as they
are an integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in
the territory of each of the Member States-alsopreclude the valid adoption of
new national legislative measures to the extent to which they would be incom-
patible with Community provisions.
158. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
159. Case 106/77 [1978] E.C.R. 629, 23 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 263 (1978).
160. It follows from the foregoing that every national court must, in a case within
its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the
latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of
national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Com-
munity rule.
Accordingly any provision ofa national egal system and any legislative, adminis-
trative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law
by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the
power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside
national legislativeprovisions which might prevent Community rules from having
full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements which are the very
essence of Community law.
This would be the case in the event of a conflict between a provision of Com-
munity law and a subsequent national law if the solution of the conflict were to be
reservedfor an authority with a discretion of its own, other than the court called
upon to apply Community law, even fsuch an impediment to the full effective-
ness of Community law were only temporary.
The first question should therefore be answered to the effect that a national
court which is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provi-
sions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if
necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of
national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the
court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or
other constitutional means.
Id. at 644, 23 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 283-84 (emphasis added).
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Indeed any recognition that national legislative measures which
encroach upon the field within which the Community exercises its legislative
power or which are otherwise incompatible with the provisions of Commu-
nity law had any legal effect would amount to a corresponding denial of the
effectiveness of obligations undertaken unconditionally and irrevocably by
Member States pursuant to the Treaty and would thus imperil the very foun-
dations of the Community. 16 1
This statement either ranks the various sources of law in the Rule of
Recognition of a single legal system that is applicable at the national
level, or it announces the effect of a conflict between two Rules of
Recognition of two separate legal systems, both of which are appli-
cable at the national level.
4. A Comparison of the Solutions Offered by Community Law and
Traditional International Law
In some respects the solutions of Community Law are similar to
those of traditional international law, while in other respects they go
beyond these traditional solutions and reflect the original nature of
the Community political and legal order.162 Any international tribu-
nal naturally will be monist in approach and therefore may be
expected to formulate propositions of law that recognize: (1) the
essential unity of international and municipal law, and hence the
theoretical automatic incorporation of international law into the
municipal sphere; (2) the self-executing nature of certain treaty pro-
visions; (3) the primacy of international law over conflicting national
law. A simple characterization of the Court's approach as monist,
however, would overlook a number of essential distinctions.
First, the criteria for direct effects differ from the criteria of
international law for the self-executing nature of treaties. The latter
essentially are subjective criteria that are based on the intent of the
contracting parties, 163 while the former, as reflected in the test used
by the Court of Justice, are more objective (the spirit, general
scheme and wording). 164 One authority has observed, moreover,
that in the Community system direct effect is the rule rather than the
161. Id at 643, 23 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 283 (emphasis added). It is unclear whether
the Court's statements are limited to Treaty provisions and "directly applicable" meas-
ures of the institutions. For a discussion of this issue and other aspects of the passage, see
T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 221-23.
162. See supra notes 3 & 113-16 and accompanying text.
163. See Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, 1928 P.C.I.J.
ser. B, No. 15 at 4, 17, 18. One commentator has noted that most international law
scholars have read this opinion as creating a presumption against "direct effect" that is
rebuttable only by explicit evidence of a contrary intention of the parties. He also has
noted that the subjective interpretation principle based on the intention of the parties has
been losing support in international law. Stein, supra note 108, at 9.
164. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
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exception.165 Second, the Treaty's endowment of sovereign govern-
mental powers upon the Community institutions is one of its essen-
tial original features, and traditional monist doctrine has yet to
account explicitly for the emergence of such legislative instruments
as regulations, directives, and decisions or their penetration into the
municipal sphere.166
Finally, traditional international law does not require states
themselves to be monist. A state discharges its international obliga-
tions once it correctly gives internal effect to norms of international
law intended to have such effect, whether its methods are predicated
upon monism or dualism (weak or strong).' 67 The Court of Justice,
however, has made it quite clear that nothing other than full and
unconditional application of the various propositions of Community
Law discussed above is compatible with the Community legal sys-
tem: the national officials, especially the courts, are truly Commu-
nity officials and are to share the same Rule of Recognition of the
separate Community legal system or, alternatively, they are to
regard their Rule of Recognition as being the same within the area
of Community Law.168 Thus, the uniform application of a Rule of
Recognition, with respect to both content and force, unites the Mem-
ber States and the Community into one overarching legal system.
Consequently, the Court consistently has resisted arguments by the
national governments that, in accordance with the practice of inter-
national law, the question of penetration is to be determined by
national constitutional law.' 69 The practices of Member States vary
considerably 70 and, therefore, any solution based on the provisions
of traditional national constitutional law will not ensure the full and
uniform application of Community Law in all the Member States.171
For similar reasons, the Court considers the unauthorized transfor-
mation of "directly applicable" regulations to be incompatible with
Community Law.172 In sum, entry into the Community, with its "re-
165. T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 196. Hartley observes that the authors of the
Treaty (and the Contracting Parties) probably did not intend the Court to have jurisdic-
tion to decide the question of direct effect or to use such liberal criteria. See id at 197.
166. Such a result is not, of course, inconsistent with the doctrine of monism. See T.
C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 225.
167. See supra pp. 34-35.
168. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., the arguments of the national governments in the Van Gend en Loos
case, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105 (1963); Stein, supra note 108, at 4-5.
170. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
171. See, ag., Bebr, supra note 73, at 487.
172. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; see also T.C. HARTLEY, supra
note 64, at 201-04. On the other hand, where national implementing measures are
required, e.g., in the case of Treaty provisions or directives or decisions addressed to
Member States, a Member State still may be liable for failure of its government to adopt
such measures, despite application of the Community measure by its national judiciary,
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shuffling of the mode of exercise of state powers agreed upon among
the Member States" brings about "a change of the whole constitu-
tion" of all the Member States. 73
5. Acceptance of the Court of Justice's Solutions of Community
Law by the National Officials of the Member States (in
particular the Judiciaries)
Having demonstrated that the Community legal system, with
Member States as its subjects, exists infact at the Community (inter-
national) level,174 the question to be considered is whether this sys-
tem also exists infact at the national level.
a. Acceptance in Fact
The various doctrines of Community Law regarding the pene-
tration of Community Law and the Community legal system into the
Member States may be viewed as elements of the Rule of Recogni-
tion of the Community legal system. Unless the national officials-
in particular the courts-in fact accept these doctrines, they will
remain theoretical propositions of law, albeit perfectly "valid"
within Community Law, made by one system (Community Law)
about another system (national law). Only if these national officials
also accept these doctrines will the Community legal system infact
exist within the Member States 75 and the national officials infact be
acting as Community officials.
The Rule of Recognition developed by the Court of Justice, in
the form of the various doctrines previously described, infact has
been accepted by the officials of all the Member States to a greater or
lesser extent. 76 There is no doubt, therefore, that the Community
applying the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. See, e.g., Case 102/79 Commis-
sion v. Kingdom of Belgium, [1980] E.C.R. 1473, 30 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 282 (1981). There
the Court stated that the direct effect of a directive is a "minimum guarantee arising from
the binding nature of the obligation imposed on the Member States by the effect of the
directives under the third paragraph of Article 189 [and] cannot justify a Member State's
absolving itself from taking in due time implementing measures sufficient to meet the
purpose of each directive." Id at 1487, 30 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 294. This provides a
further possible contrast with more traditional international law, where judicial applica-
tion of an international rule may remedy governmental failure to adopt implementing
measures. See Schermers, The Law as it Stands Against Treaty Violations by States, 1975
LEGAL ISSUES OF EuR. INTEGRATION 113, 121.
173. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
174. The Community legal system satisfies Hart's three requirements for a legal
system:
(1) There exists a union of primary and secondary rules.
(2) The officials acting through the Community institutions effectively accept
these secondary rules as critical, common, public standards of official behavior.
(3) There exists general compliance by the subjects of the legal system, i.e.,
Member States, with their obligations under Community Law.
175. See text accompanying notes 41-49 & p. 35.
176. See infra note 181.
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legal system indeed does exist within the Member States, even
though there may not be complete recognition in some Member
States of its true nature and full extent. Although all Member States
effectively have incorporated the Community legal system, accept-
ance may be incomplete for several reasons. First, the national judi-
ciary may refuse to recognize the full extent of the doctrine of direct
effects.177 Second, the national judiciary may accept the direct effect
of Community Law, but it may not accept fully the principle of
supremacy 178 or the issue of supremacy may not be resolved fully. 179
Finally, even where the national judiciary has accepted the direct
effect of Community Law and has acknowledged its supremacy over
all norms of national law-including constitutional guarantees of
fundamental rights-this may be based on national constitutional
law rather than on the emergence of a new Community
Constitution. 180
Subject to these qualifications, the direct effect and supremacy
of Community Law have been accepted fully in nearly all the Mem-
ber States.181 Hart's theory is quite able to account for any cases of
incomplete acceptance. Such cases may be characterized as cases of
partial failure as defined by Hart-there is disunity among the set of
Community officials. 182 The Rule of Recognition of the Community
legal system, reaching into a Member State, possesses a "penumbra
of doubt." Nevertheless, the Community legal system continues "to
exist" despite the absence of that complete official consensus that
prevails under normal conditions.18 3
177. See, e.g., the decision of the French Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 22, 1978, Cohn-Bendit
(Daniel) [1979] Dalluz Jur. 155, excerpted in (1979) CAH. DR. EUR. 265. In this judg-
ment the Conseil d'Etat denied that any directive could have direct effect.
178. Thus, the German and Italian Constitutional Courts reserve power to protect
fundamental rights of their nationals against violations by the Community institutions.
See Stein, supra note 108, at 16.
179. For example, in the United Kingdom and Denmark the courts have yet to deter-
mine the effect of a conflict between Community Law and a clearly inconsistent act of the
legislature.
180. See e.g., March Hunnings, Enforceability of the EEC-EFJ'A Free Trade Agree-
ments, 2 EUR. L. Rlv. 163, 174-75 (1977).
181. For a more detailed survey of the reaction of the national judges, see E. STEIN, P.
HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 76, at 214-61, 288-93. As a result of this accept-
ance, a Member State may solve the question of the penetration of Community Law
differently from the question of the penetration of traditional international law. This
difference will be more striking, of course, in a "dualist" jurisdiction, especially if that
dualism takes its strong form, as for example in the United Kingdom. Further discussion
of the reaction of the national courts is contained in T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at
224-46, and in the "compliance studies" discussed supra note 102.
182. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
183. Id
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b. The Role of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure Under Article
177 of the E.E.C. Treaty
A major factor contributing towards the national judiciaries'
overall acceptance of Community Law and the Community legal
system has been the national judiciaries' acceptance and use of the
preliminary ruling procedure provided by Article 177 of the E.E.C.
Treaty.184 This highly original feature of the Community legal sys-
tem distinguishes it in yet another fundamental respect from more
traditional forms of international law. The preliminary ruling pro-
cedure provides an organic link between the national judiciaries and
the Court of Justice and enables the national courts to play their full
role as Community officials.
The acceptance and use of the Article 177 mechanism ensures
the effective penetration of the Community legal system and Com-
munity Law, provides judicial protection for private individuals'
rights under Community Law, and facilitates the effective enforce-
ment of the Community obligations of Member States.18 5 These
effects are the results of several factors. First, the E.E.C. Treaty not
only confers jurisdiction on the Court of Justice to give preliminary
rulings concerning the validity of acts of Community institutions
184. Because one may doubt whether there would have been such effective acceptance
of the Community legal system without such a mechanism, the importance of the Article
177 procedure cannot be overemphasized and it merits quoting in full:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State,
that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is neces-
sary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling
thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal
of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177, reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 72. One should note that the decision whether or not to make a reference lies with the
national court, not with the parties. This, together with the fact that the application of the
Court's ruling remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national court making the
reference, distinguishes the competence of the Court of Justice under Article 177 from
that of a court of appeals. See T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 247-48. For a survey of
the practices of the national judiciaries with respect to their acceptance and use of the
Article 177 procedure, see Hay & Thompson, The Community Court and Supremacy of
Community Law: A Progress Report, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 651, 656-58 (1975), and
the "compliance studies" discussed supra note 102.
185. For a discussion of the details of the Article 177 procedure, see T.C. HARTLEY,
supra note 64, at 247-82.
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(thereby ensuring protection against unlawful Community activity),
but it also confers jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of the
Treaty and the acts of the institution.' 86 The Court has character-
ized the various issues relating to the penetration of Community
Law into the Member States--direct effect and supremacy-as ques-
tions of interpretation and thus has seized for itself jurisdiction to
shape the Community Constitution. 187 Indeed, nearly all of the
Court's major "constitutional" decisions have flowed from a refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling under Article 177.188 Second, the exist-
ence of the preliminary ruling procedure ensures that issues of
Community Law that arise in the national courts come before the
Court of Justice and are resolved uniformly in accordance with
Community Law. Thus a national court or tribunal always may ask
for a preliminary ruling if it considers a decision on a question of
Community Law necessary to enable it to issue a judgment. A court
or tribunal of last resort that considers such a decision necessary,
however, is under an obligation to refer the question unless the issue
already has been decided by the Court or unless the correct applica-
tion of Community Law is "so obvious as to leave no scope for any
reasonable doubt."' 8 9 Finally, the better view appears to be that pre-
liminary rulings have effect erga omnes. Therefore, not only is the
186. The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity Treaty is somewhat more restrictive. Under Article 41 of that Treaty, the Court
only has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the validity of acts of the High
Authority (Commission) and of the Council. E.C.S.C. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 41,
reprinted in DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 8.
187. This seizure transpired despite early resistance by the governments of the Mem-
ber States. See, for example, the submissions of the national governments in the Van
Gend en Loos case, where the governments denied that the Court had any jurisdiction at
all to consider the "direct effect" of Treaty provisions, and the discussion in Stein, supra
note 108, at 4-5.
188. For example, all the judgments of the Court establishing the "propositions of
Community Law" regarding the incorporation, direct effect, and supremacy of Commu-
nity Law, which are discussed and cited in this Article, were given following such a
reference. It was necessary for the Court to characterize the questions of direct effects
and supremacy of Community Law as questions of "interpretation," because Article 177
confers no jurisdiction on the Court to rule on the validity of national provisions under
Community Law. A declaration that conflicting national provisions are invalid involves
the application of the Court's "interpretation." The Court has drawn a line between its
jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty and acts of the institutions, and the actual application
of that interpretation to the facts of the case. This remains within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the national court making the reference, although that court is obligated to apply
the ruling correctly. See T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 280-81.
189. Case 283/81 CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, [1982] E.C.R. 3415, 3432, 36 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 472,491 (1983). The Court laid down a number of stringent requirements that
must be met before the national court or tribunal is entitled to find that the correct appli-
cation of Community Law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt.
For a discussion of this case, as well as of the abuses of the "acte claire" doctrine by some
national courts, see Bebr, The Rambling Ghost of "Cohn-Bendit" Acte Claire and the
Court of Justice, 20 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 439 (1983); see also T.C. HARTLEY, supra note
64, at 269-72. On the possibility of invoking the procedure under Article 169 to enforce
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national court or tribunal that makes the reference bound by the rul-
ing, but all national courts and tribunals in all Member States are
bound similarly even though they are permitted to make another ref-
erence concerning the question.190
IV
CONCLUSIONS
This Article has attempted to demonstrate that the theories
articulated by H.L.A. Hart provide an appropriate legal model that
explains and supports the ambitious claims made by the European
Court of Justice, namely:
(1) European Community Law constitutes an autonomous legal system that
penetrates the national legal systems of the Member States and that
their courts are bound to apply; and
(2) the existence of the Community legal system, and its penetration of the
national legal systems, distinguishes European Community Law from
traditional international law.
A. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: A WELL-DEVELOPED
LEGAL SYSTEM
This Article has examined the main elements of Hart's theory
concerning the existence of a legal system. Hart has proposed three
minimum conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the exist-
ence of a legal system as opposed to a simple set of primary rules of
obligation. These conditions are: (1) there exists a union of primary
rules of obligation and secondary rules of change, adjudication and
recognition; (2) the officials of the system, particularly the courts,
effectively accept the secondary rules as critical, common, public
standards of official behavior; and, (3) there exists general compli-
ance with the rules of behavior that are valid under the system's
Rule of Recognition.
By viewing the European Community polity from both the per-
spective of the sovereign state (the traditional subject of interna-
tional law) and from that of the private individual (the traditional
the obligation of national courts of last resort, see, e.g., The Commission's Answer to
W.Q. No. 526/83, 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 268) 25 (1983).
190. The Court already has established that a preliminary ruling declaring an act of a
Community institution invalid has such an erga omnes effect. See Case 166/80 Interna-
tional Chemical Corporation v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, [1981]
E.C.R. 1191, 1223, 37 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 593, 623 (1983). It has not yet decided, however,
whether a preliminary interpretative ruling has such an effect. For a discussion of this
issue and the Court's decision in the International Chemical case, see Bebr, Preliminary
Rulings of the Court of Justice: Their Authority and Temporal Effect, 18 COMM. MKT. L.
Rlv. 475 (1981); see also T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 280-82. The article by Bebr
also discusses the Court's case law on the "temporal effect" of preliminary rulings, i.e.,
whether they have effect ex tunc or ex nunc.
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subject of the sovereign state), it has been demonstrated that one
truly may speak of a Community political order with a Community
Constitution and a legal system. The sovereign Member States are
the subjects of a well-developed political and legal order since all
three of Hart's minimum conditions clearly are satisfied. Even
viewed at this Community or international level, there is a clear
union of primary and secondary rules. The Treaties contain secon-
dary power-conferring rules of change and adjudication under
which Community institutions exercise sovereign powers over the
community of Member States. These powers were transferred to the
Community institutions by the Member States, and there is a well-
developed Rule of Recognition unifying the system. The officials of
the system, acting through the Community institutions, effectively
accept these secondary rules as critical, common, public standards of
official behavior, and there is general compliance with the rules of
behavior that are valid under the system's Rule of Recognition.
It is only by examining the legal position of the private individ-
ual under Community Law, however, that the full extent and true
nature of Community Law and the Community legal system become
evident. The Court of Justice has formulated various propositions of
law regarding the penetration of the Community legal system into
the Member States. These propositions entail:
(1) The application of Community Law and the Community legal system
as such on the territory of a Member State, merely as a result of its entry
into the Community.
(2) Extensive recognition of the doctrine of the direct effect of certain provi-
sions of "directly applicable" regulations and non-"directly applicable"
Treaty provisions, directives, and decisions addressed to Member
States.
(3) Absolute and unqualified supremacy of directly effective Community
Law over conflicting national law.
These propositions of law represent the Court's view of the con-
tent of the Rule of Recognition that must be used by the national
officials, especially the judiciary, when acting in the Community
sphere. The Court has been uncompromising in its insistence that
the same Rule of Recognition is to apply at the national level
throughout the whole Community, thereby ensuring the effective
and uniform application of Community Law within the Member
States. The Court has justified this attitude by emphasizing the orig-
inal and sui generis nature of the Community and by contrasting
Community Law with traditional international law, focusing in par-
ticular on the transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States
to the Community institutions.
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The various claims made by the Court of Justice would remain
mere theoretical propositions of law made by one system, Commu-
nity Law, about another system, national law, unless the national
officials, especially the national judiciaries, also in fact accepted
them as part of their Rule of Recognition. Without such acceptance,
even though these propositions of law about the existence of the
Community legal system would be perfectly "valid" in Community
Law, the Community legal system in fact would not exist at the
national level. Because the Court's formulation of the Rule of Rec-
ognition to be applied at the national level effectively has been fully
accepted in most Member States, the Community legal system does
exist in fact at the national level and the national officials do act as
Community officials. This is true even though there may not be full
acceptance within a particular Member State-such cases may be
characterized as cases of "partial failure" where there is disunity
among the set of Community officials, i.e., Community institutions,
especially the Commission and Court of Justice, versus national gov-
ernments and national judiciaries.
A major factor contributing to the overall acceptance, and thus
effective penetration, of Community Law and the Community legal
system has been the national judiciaries' acceptance and use of the
Article 177 preliminary ruling procedure. That procedure has
helped to ensure that issues of Community Law that arise before the
national courts come before the Court of Justice, and has enabled
the Court to deliver most of its major "constitutional" judgments
concerning the penetration of the Community legal system under the
guise of interpreting the Treaties or acts of the institutions.
The Article 177 procedure also helps to ensure that the Commu-
nity legal system in fact exists not only at the national level, with
private individuals as its subjects, but also at the Community or
international level, with Member States as its subjects. General
compliance by the Member States with their obligations under Com-
munity Law is to a large extent dependent upon the effective pene-
tration of Community Law into the Member States; this penetration
enables private individuals to invoke Community Law before their
national courts and to enforce their rights against the national
authorities. This effective penetration is in turn dependent upon the
existence of the Article 177 procedure and its acceptance and use by
the national judiciaries. Thus, this organic link between the Court of
Justice and the national judiciaries has allowed the circumvention of
national governments and, perhaps more than anything else, has
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contributed to the existence of the Community legal system at the
Community and national levels.
B. A COMPARISON OF COMMUNITY LAW AND TRADITIONAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the description of European Community Law within the
framework of Hart's theoretical model of a legal system, this Article
has presented several major distinctions between Community Law
and traditional international law. It is worth repeating the main dis-
tinctions so that one may appreciate fully the original and suigeneris
nature of the Community political and legal order, and so that one
also may draw some tentative conclusions about possible future
developments in international law generally.
. Contrasts with Traditional International Law
Even when viewed at the Community or international level, the
formal structure of Community Law differs markedly from that of
more traditional international law. By contrast with traditional
international law, which Hart considers to resemble more closely a
simple regime of primary or customary rules, Community Law
forms a well-developed legal system. The obligations of the Member
States, which flow from the Treaties and the Community institu-
tions' exercise of the sovereign powers transferred to them by the
Member States, represent a particularly strong limitation upon the
external, outward-looking sovereignty of the states as members of
the international community of Member States.
One may perhaps object that the form of a legal system obscures
the reality of a weak limitation upon state sovereignty because the
Member States agreed to conclude the Treaty and because the voting
practice in the Council gives a Member State's government an effec-
tive veto over the adoption of any legislative act involving its "very
important interests." While it must be conceded that the Member
States have consented to be bound by the Treaties and that the adop-
tion of Community legislation also requires their consent in the
Council, this should not obscure several essential points.
First, even within the present decision-making structure, Com-
munity obligations may arise and operate independently of the con-
sent of the Member States' governments. In a number of instances,
the Court of Justice has interpreted the Treaty in an expansive, con-
stitutional manner, contrary to the probable intention of its authors
and the Contracting Parties. For example, the Court has seized for
itself jurisdiction to decide the question of direct effect of provisions
of Community Law and has used liberal, objective criteria for deter-
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mining such direct effect, 191 and it has advanced the doctrine of the
implied treaty-making powers of the Community under the E.E.C.
Treaty. 9 2 Also, once an obligation has been created, it effectively
operates independently of the consent of the government of a Mem-
ber State. Although the government may wish to breach its obliga-
tions, it is frequently unable to do so. This inability results not so
much because of the Article 169 procedure, but more particularly,
because of the vigilance of private individuals seeking to enforce
their directly effective rights, and the national judiciaries' coopera-
tion in using the Article 177 procedure. Any argument that this
cooperation in fact represents the consent of the sovereign Member
State to be bound by Community Law would be incoherent, espe-
cialy since one organ of the "sovereign," the government, then
would be in disagreement with another, the judiciary.
Second, even where a Member State's government has a choice
whether to give or to withhold its consent, the exercise of that "sov-
ereign will" may be more constrained in the context of the Commu-
nity decision-making structures than in those of more traditional
international law. The combination of a number of factors may lead
Member States' governments to perceive that their mutual self-inter-
est requires that they cooperate in consenting to and abiding by
Community obligations. 193
191. See T.C: HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 197.
192. See Opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement Establishing A European Laying-Up Fund
for Inland Waterway Vessels, [1977] E.C.R. 741, 20 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 279 (1977), for the
most explicit statement of the implied treaty-making power of the E.E.C. The Court
stated:
The power of the Community to conclude such an agreement is not expressly
laid down in the Treaty. However. . . authority to enter into international com-
mitments may not only arise from an express attribution by the Treaty, but
equally may flow implicitly from its provisions.. . . [Tihe power to bind the
Community vis-a-vis third countries nevertheless flows by implication from the
provisions of the Treaty creating the internal power and in so far as the partici-
pation of the Community in the international agreement is, as here, necessary for
the attainment of one of the objectives of the Community.
Id. at 755, 20 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 295-96.
For a discussion of the view that the authors of the E.E.C. Treaty probably intended to
restrict the Community's treaty-making power to those limited cases in which such power
is conferred expressly by the Treaty, see T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 150-51, 164-65;
Stein, supra note 108, at 24. For a discussion of the Community's treaty-making powers
in general, see T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 64, at 145-80.
193. This perception of the benefits of cooperation may flow from many factors. For
example:
(a) the wide scope of Community activities;
(b) the highly developed original institutional structure of the Community, in which:
-an independent Commission representing the interests of the Community as a
whole has the "right of initiative" and proposes legislation;
-private individuals are involved in the law-making process;
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Finally, possible future institutional developments should not
be discounted. In this regard, it must be remembered that the Treaty
calls for most decisions to be made by qualified majority based on
weighted voting, and there seem to be some recent indications of a
possible gradual return to such majority voting.194 Moreover, there
is pressure to transfer more power to the democratic, directly-elected
European Parliament. If the power of this institution increases, the
creation of Community Law will depend less upon the consent of the
governments of the Member States.
Perhaps the most unique and original feature of Community
Law is that private individuals as well as the Member States are the
subjects of a well-developed "legal system" that has been created by
international agreement. The originality lies not so much in that
Community Law seeks to modify the legal position of individuals, as
in: (1) the Community institutions' exercise of governmentalpowers
that directly and indirectly regulate the legal position of individuals
over an extremely wide range of economic activities; and (2) the sta-
tus of the individual as a full "procedural subject" of the Commu-
nity legal system, with direct access to the "international" Court of
Justice to challenge unlawful Community activity, and indirect
access to the Court through use of the Article 177 procedure to pro-
tect rights against both the Community institutions and the Member
States. Legislative activity directed at individuals traditionally has
fallen within the competence of the municipal political and legal
orders of the sovereign states. The conferment of such governmental
power upon the Community institutions represents the reordering of
the inward-looking governmental powers of the sovereign over its
traditional subjects.
In view of this grand design of the Treaties, the doctrines of the
Court regarding the penetration of Community Law should cause
little surprise. In some respects, the Court's solutions to the ques-
tions of incorporation of Community Law and the effect of Commu-
nity Law and its status before the national courts are similar to those
that may be expected from any international tribunal. In other
important respects, however, these solutions go beyond the present
state of international law and reflect the original nature of the Coin-
-the independent Commission together with the Court of Justice ensures the
effective enforcement of Community obligations of the Member States (Article
169, Article 177);
(c) the evergrowing economic and political interdependence of the Member States.
194. See Recent Developments, Council of the European Community Ignores British
Attempt to Exercise Implied Veto Power of Luxembourg Compromise, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 135 (1983).
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munity political and legal order; they are predicated upon the Mem-
ber States' entry into a new polity that involves a "definitive
limitation" of their sovereign rights, and "a change of the whole con-
stitution" of all the Member States. As a leading authority recently
has observed, the supranational European Community, although not
a federal state, nevertheless possesses many characteristics typical of
a federal structure.195 Seen in this light, the doctrines of the Court of
195. See generally Bridge, supra note 114. In this very interesting and illuminating
article, Bridge compares the European Community system to the federal system of the
United States. Bridge identifies five characteristics that are typical of a federal structure:
First, it is a permanent union of sovereign states for common purposes.
Second, legislative authority is divided between the union and the constituent
states in terms that the former has enumerated authority while the latter retain
residual authority.
Third, the laws made by both the union and the constituent states, within their
assigned spheres, should operate directly on all persons and things within their
respective territorial limits.
Fourth, the union should be supreme in its assigned sphere over any contrary
assertions of power by the constituent states.
Fifth, both the union and the constituent states, within their assigned spheres,
should have a complete apparatus of law enforcement.
Id. at 133-37. Bridge notes that the Community does not possess exactly all five charac-
teristics to the full extent typical of a federal state. For example, he notes that:
(a) Regarding the second characteristic:
inhere is a noticeable change of emphasis reflecting the relative scope of the
United States and the European Community. Whereas in the United States the
scale of federal power greatly outbalances the power of the states, in the Euro-
pean Community the scale of power of the member states greatly outbalances the
power of the Community.
Id. at 134-35.
(b) Regarding the fourth characteristic:
[While the transfer of sovereign power to the Community implies the absolute
and unqualified supremacy of Community Law over conflicting national law,]
there is evidence that there has not been a once-and-for-all transfer of powers;
the transfer is a continuing process in direct relation to the evolving and dynamic
nature of the Community.
Id. at 136.
(c) Regarding the fifth characteristic:
In relation to the Community itself, however, there is a noteworthy deviation
from the accepted federal principle. In the United States the enforcement of
federal law is largely the responsibility of federal courts and federal agencies. In
the European Community the enforcement of Community Law is largely the
responsibility of the courts and agencies of the member states.Id
After this analysis Bridge concludes, however, that:
[W]hile it is clear that the European Community is not a federal state, it is
equally clear that it either has or reflects many such characteristics. Like a fed-
eral state it is a creation of the law and the law supplies it with the necessary
cohesive and coercive qualities. There is a federally typical division of allegiance
between the Community and its constituent member states, with the original
identity and much of the powers of the latter being preserved. Unlike interna-
tional law and typical international organizations, the European Community has
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Justice perhaps owe more to the logic of the federal analogy than to
the origin of the Community as a creation of international law,
although this distinction is sometimes obscured due to the similarity
of the issues involved in the relationship of federal law to state law
on the one hand and that of international law to municipal law on
the other.19 6
a distinct and complete legal system which acts co-operatively with the laws of
the member states. The European Community falls quite genuinely between the
accepted categories of legal and political organization.
Id. at 137; see generally id at 132-37.
For a further, very important, recent study comparing the European Community to the
federal system of the United States, see COURTS AND FREE MARKETS (T. Sandelow & E.
Stein eds. 1982), especially the introductory essay by the two editors. The study consists
of a series of papers that undertake a comparative examination of the contribution made
by the Supreme Court and the Court of Justice in maintaining a continent-wide "com-
mon market" in the United States and the European Community.
196. See the discussion regarding the issues involved in the penetration of interna-
tional law into the municipal sphere, supra pp. 32-33, and the third and fourth character-
istics of the federal structure as identified by Bridge, supra note 195.
The similarity of the issues may obscure the true suigeneris and original nature of the
Community. Thus, the Court's claim that the Community constitutes a new legal order
suigeneris in contrast to traditional international treaties recently has been questioned by
a leading authority. See Wyatt, New Legal Order, or Old4 7 EUR. L. REv. 147 (1982).
Wyatt identifies four characteristics that "are alleged to emerge from the case law of the
European Court" and that, it has been argued, "distance Community law from tradi-
tional public international law":
(1) the E.E.C. Treaty modifies the legal position of persons subject to the
national legal systems;
(2) Community Law overrides national law;
(3) national courts are under a direct duty to give effect to clearly defined and
unconditional obligations in the E.E.C. Treaty;
(4) the techniques of interpretation applicable in Community Law are to be
distinguished from those current in international practice.
Id at 147-48. Wyatt also notes that a further argument in favor of the suigeneris charac-
ter of Community Law might also be made on the basis of the Court's recourse to general
principles of Community Law, which are based on comparative national constitutional
law and the terms of international treaties with which Member States are associated.
Wyatt submits, however, that these "characteristics of Community Law. . . are quite
explicable in terms of traditional international legal theory and practice .... " Id He
maintains:
The notion of the "new legal order" owes less to an objective assessment of the
legal characteristics of Community Law than to the descriptive language used by
the European Court, and an understandable concern lest the grand design of the
Treaty be misunderstood by national tribunals more familiar with international
instruments of more limited and specialized ambit.
Id at 147. He is forced to concede, however, that:
It is also probably true to say that the E.E.C. Treaty has had a greater practical
impact on the national systems of Member States than other international trea-
ties have had on the legal systems of their signatories, providing the European
Court with the opportunity of developing an unprecedentedly comprehensive
case law. The present writer does not question the sophistication of the edifice,
or the grandness of the design; he would simply suggest that the "new technol-
ogy" leans rather more heavily than is sometimes admitted on the previous state
of the art.
Id. at 157-58.
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2 Possible Implications for the Future of International Law
Generally
Hart considers that the present formal structure of international
law more closely resembles a simple set of primary rules or custom-
ary law, so that the analogies with municipal law are more of func-
tion and content rather than form. He nevertheless speculates that
"[p]erhaps international law is at present in a stage of transition
towards acceptance of. . .forms which would bring it nearer in
structure to a municipal system."' 97 One can speculate further that
international law is perhaps in the process of spawning a number of
different "legal systems" created by treaties regulating different
problem areas and with different states, and perhaps private individ-
uals, as subjects of the various communities.
Hart's model of law and a legal system instructs one, however,
that three minimum conditions must be satisfied before one can
speak of such a "legal system" of international law binding a partic-
ular community of states or individuals as its subjects. In particular,
the extent to which the condition of the sovereign states' general
compliance with the rules of the system is satisfied may depend upon
the creation of well-developed dispute settlement and enforcement
mechanisms at the international level, e.g., Article 169 of the E.E.C.
Treaty-an independent body in a "watchdog" role with possible
eventual recourse to an adjudicatory body with compulsory jurisdic-
tion. The experience of the European Community cautions even
further, however, that states will perhaps satisfactorily comply with
the rules of the system only if the private individual can act as a
"private policeman" at the national level. The private individual
will be able to perform this role only if the legal system is designed
to penetrate the municipal sphere and the national judiciary gives
effect to this penetration by its acceptance of the system. This in turn
Wyatt may be correct in his thesis that "nothing is to be lost, and much to be gained,
from openly extending the sources of Community Law, in appropriate cases, to tradi-
tional international legal practice." Id at 164. He appears, however, to overlook that it is
precisely the "sophistication of the edifice" and the "grandness of the design" of the
Treaty (the highly developed institutional structure and the transfer of legislative author-
ity to exercise governmental powers over a wide area, entailing the creation of a new
polity and "Community Constitution") together with the "greater practical impact on the
national systems of Member States than other international treaties. . . ." (deep aiqd
pervasive penetration of Community Law within the Member States, acceptance and use
of the Article 177 mechanism) that justifies the claim that Community Law forms a
"legal system" that reaches into the Member States and is more analogous to a federal
structure than to traditional international law. Consequently, where the distinction is of
significance, the Court may be expected to continue to shape Community Law in a "con-
stitutional" rather than an "international law" mode and thus to promote the ever
increasing integration of the Member States and their peoples in the European
Community.
197. H.L.A. HART, supra note 6, at 231.
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may well depend upon the existence and acceptance of a mechanism
that provides an organic link between the national judiciary and the
international tribunal.198 This willingness to "accept" the system
and any such link may depend upon the scope of the legal system of
international law. Perhaps it is only when the scope is sufficiently
broad, perhaps indeed only when it constitutes a new polity, that the
national judiciary will be induced to transfer its loyalties.
The extent to which sovereign states will agree to relinquish
their sovereignty-both external and internal-and to enter a new
polity of a quasi-federal nature such as the European Community, is
necessarily speculative. Such developments perhaps may be
expected to occur initially on a regional level. In any event, Hart
counsels us that the embryology and existence of "international"
political orders and their corresponding legal systems is dependent
upon facts, not dogma. Perhaps the last word may be given to the
scholar who noted that: "Integration-whether economic or polit-
ical, or both--constitutes a continuum rather than a boundary line,
and there is a twilight area rather than a clear threshhold between
semi-amalgamated units." 199
198. The possible "links" between national judiciaries and international tribunals are
explored in Mosler, Supra-National Judicial Decisions and National Courts, 4 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 425 (1981). For Mosler's treatment of preliminary rulings, see id
at 445-47.
199. Bridge, supra note 114, at 137 (quoting M. BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS:
ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 136 (1968)).
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